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Intrapersonal Communication: the Hidden Language

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Abstract:

This article pays particular attention to the pivotal relationship between the “private” or “internal” use of language which is conjectured to mediate self-awareness, and the way in which people “operate” on and in the “real” world using “public” language. Despite the apparent ease with which we (un)consciously perform the act of linguistic intercourse, it is shown that the underlying philosophical issues regarding the nature and mode of such postulated “intrapersonal communication” are inherently intricate. The arguments regarding the possibility and meaning of a radically “Private Language” are elaborated, together with the implications of these arguments in applying communication theory to self-awareness. We stress throughout Wittgenstein’s conception of a “philosophical therapy for (and through) language” – and of a “linguistic therapy for (and through) philosophy.” The point is strongly made that it thus behoves the professional communicator, and in particular the therapist, to have an appreciation of these issues, which form a bedrock to modern linguistic therapy and therapeutic linguistics.

Keywords:

Communication theory, creativity, intrapersonal communication, mysticism, philosophy, private language, psycholinguistics, psychotherapy, self-awareness, self-talk, Wittgenstein.

The Twentyfifth Name of God

Speak Your Mind נ ת ה

SOCRATES: Now by ‘thinking’ do you mean the same as I do?

THEAETETUS: What do you mean by it?

SOCRATES: A talk which the soul has with itself about the objects under its consideration. Of course, I’m only telling you my idea in all ignorance; but this is the kind of picture I have of it. It seems to me that the soul when it thinks is simply carrying on a discussion in which it asks itself questions and answers them itself, affirms and denies. And when it arrives at something definite, either by a gradual process or a sudden leap, when it affirms one thing consistently and without divided counsel, we call this judgment. So, in my view, to judge is to make a statement, and a judgment is a statement which is not addressed to another person or spoken aloud, but silently addressed to oneself.

Plato: *Theaetetus* 189e – 190a [1].

The Fortieth Name of God

Speaking the Right Words

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HAMLET: Then is doomsday near: but your news is not true. Let me question more in particular: what have you, my good friends, deserved at the hands of fortune, that she sends you to prison hither?

GUILDENSTERN: Prison, my lord!

HAMLET: Denmark's a prison.

ROSENCRANTZ: Then is the world one.

HAMLET: A goodly one; in which there are many confines, wards and dungeons, Denmark being one o' the worst.

ROSENCRANTZ: We think not so, my lord.

HAMLET: Why, then, 'tis none to you; for there is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so: to me it is a prison.

ROSENCRANTZ: Why then, your ambition makes it one; 'tis too narrow for your mind.

HAMLET: O God, I could be bounded in a nut shell and count myself a king of infinite space, were it not that I have bad dreams.

GUILDENSTERN: Which dreams indeed are ambition, for the very substance of the ambitious is merely the shadow of a dream.

HAMLET: A dream itself is but a shadow.

ROSENCRANTZ: Truly, and I hold ambition of so airy and light a quality that it is but a shadow's shadow.

Shakespeare: *Hamlet*: Act II Scene ii [2].

“While virtually everyone agrees that Ludwig Wittgenstein’s posthumous masterpiece is the greatest philosophical work of the 20th century, no two people seem to agree about what constitutes its greatness. There is a good reason for this: nobody is entirely sure what Wittgenstein was wittering on about. Philosophical Investigations is written as a series of numbered aphorisms, each of which is clear as mud. ‘If I have exhausted the justifications, I have reached bedrock and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: “This is simply what I do”.’ Huh? ‘What remains if I subtract the fact that my arm went up from the fact that I raised my arm?’ Not a lot, if you ask me. But then again ... Those with the patience to unravel the tangled threads of Wittgenstein’s musings find themselves facing the even more vexing problem that, when taken as a totality, there is no identifiable overriding theory ... One thing that we can be sure about (probably) is that Wittgenstein regarded the misuse of language as the origin of philosophical befuddlement. He says: ‘Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language’.”

M Syed

“I have really read ...

Philosophical Investigations by Ludwig Wittgenstein” [3].

In order to get to grips with Wittgenstein’s idea of “the misuse of language as the origin of philosophical befuddlement,” let us backtrack somewhat and start with a consideration of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* ... the work that defined Wittgenstein’s earlier approach to philosophy, in which language ... took centre stage ... The opening line is marvellous: “The world is everything that is the case” [3]. Despite the fact that we may feel that “there is no identifiable overriding theory,” Wittgenstein does explain in the Preface to the *Tractatus* that “The book deals with the problems of philosophy and shows, I believe, that the method of formulating these problems rests on the misunderstanding of the logic of our language. Its whole meaning could be summed up somewhat as follows: What can be said at all can be said clearly; and whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent” [4]. And so, in trying to unmesh the “tangled threads” of Wittgenstein’s philosophizing, we enter a “surrogationalist” world of “mystical solipsism,” where “philosophy is not a silent practice” [5] and in which the central tenets are: “(i) that words have meanings by ‘standing for’ entities, properties, relations, etc., and (ii) that the entities, properties, relations, etc., are given independently of the words standing for them” [6]. Thus “In the world of the *Tractatus* symbols have two employment opportunities open to them: either to say something about the world (the function

of describing) or to *show* something about the world (the function of revealing ontological structure" [7]. In this way "Propositions such as 'It is raining' say something that is either true or false; contradictions and tautologies on the other hand, are neither true nor false – they show instead that the world has a structure such that if certain signs are combined then contradictions or tautologies are created" [7]. Now, "The way Wittgenstein gets from the world to where he thinks *all* the problems and answer really lie, i.e., the proposition, is via the notion of a *thought*. Having urged us to think of the world as being made up of facts not things, Wittgenstein then ... introduces the central idea of *picturing* the facts of the world" [8]. Wittgenstein elaborates this by saying that "We picture facts to ourselves ... A picture is a model of reality ... In a picture objects have the elements of the picture corresponding to them ... In a picture the elements of the picture are the representations of objects ... What constitutes a picture is that its elements are related to one another in a determinate way ... A picture is a fact ... What any picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it – correctly or incorrectly – in any way at all, is logical form, i.e., the form of reality ... A picture whose pictorial form is logical form is called a logical picture ... Every picture is *at the same time* a logical one. (On the other hand, not every picture is, for example, a spatial one.) ... A logical picture of facts is a thought ... In the proposition the thought is expressed perceptibly through the senses" [9]. And if "the world is everything that is the case," then we can go on to say that "... A thought is a proposition with sense ... The totality of propositions is language ... A proposition is a picture of reality. A proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it" [9]. Now the nature of these Wittgensteinian "pictures" require some thought, since "At first sight a proposition – one set out on the printed page, for example – does not seem to be a picture of the reality with which it is concerned. But neither do written notes seem at first sight to be a picture of a piece of music, nor or phonetic notation (the alphabet) to be a picture of speech. And yet these sign-languages prove to be pictures, even in the ordinary sense, of what they represent" [9]. And so, in this case, at the inception of the Word, and thus the World, " ... we can see how important it is to Wittgenstein's analysis that facts are articulate. It is because facts have parts that they can be pictured, the elements of the picture corresponding to the objects that constitute the fact" [8], and we thus understand Wittgenstein's aphorism that "The limits of my language are the limits of my world" [9], and that the purpose of the *Tractatus* is to " ... draw a limit to thinking, or rather – not to thinking, but to the expression of thoughts; for in order to draw a limit to thinking we should have to be able to think both sides of this limit (we should therefore have to be able to think what cannot be thought). The limit can, therefore, only be drawn in language and what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense" [4]. We can summarize the fundamental idea of the *Tractatus* as being that " ... *all* philosophical propositions are nonsensical – including the ones in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. One is reminded of the first line of the *Tao Tê Ching*, which says: 'The Tao that can be expressed is not the eternal Tao'" [8]. In fact Monk's summary is that "Its [*Tractatus*'s] main point is to answer the 'cardinal problem of philosophy', i.e., the question of where the limits of expressibility lie" [8]. Now the crucial importance of this lies in the fact that "In giving what he

thought was a definitively and unassailably true answer to that question, Wittgenstein considered himself to have cleared up *all* problems of philosophy, and, in particular, to have defined the realm of the ethical. In both logic and ethics, the central point is the same and can be summed up in the sentence that occurs twice in the book, once in the preface and again as the final sentence: 'Whereof once cannot speak thereof one must be silent' [8]. So on the one hand, "In holding that the only genuine bearers of meaning are elementary, logically independent, fact-stating propositions, the *Tractatus* is, by its own lights, a foredoomed attempt to transgress these limits. For its propositions are elucidations and tautologies which say nothing, and the elucidations are, like all genuinely philosophical utterances, profoundly nonsensical efforts to say the unsayable" [5] – yet on the other, it " ... still manages to communicate an unassailable and definitive truth about philosophy – viz., that any attempt to say something philosophical results in nonsense. It does this by getting the reader to see that its own propositions are nonsense and that they are nonsense *because* they try to say something philosophical" [8]. We shall return later to an interrogation of these validity of these arguments as applied to the human psyche, self-awareness, intrapersonal communication, and mysticophilosophicolinguistic therapy via an excursion in Eden – "That spot to which I point is *Paradise*, / *Adams* abode, those loftie shades his Bowre" [10] – where our mythical forebears' "Unspeakable desire to see, and know" [10], their decision to "speak, rather than remaining silent," their "profoundly nonsensical efforts to say the unsayable," lead to the dawning of a new kind of awareness, to the inception of a new form of life, a new language game.

So, let us now turn at "midnight in the garden of good and evil" [11] to Adam and Eve, and ask whether, on "transgressing the limits" and eating "the fruit of that forbidden tree" [10], it would have made Adam Namer more mad a man to mutter muddled meanings to his meet help, or hear Chava say them solipsistically, speaking solely to herself, realising " ... What thou seest, / What there thou seest fair Creature is thy self, / With thee it came and goes ... " [10] in their burgeoning state of self-awareness? And so that insightful eve, "Damn!" the first man might declare even to Eve: "Madam in Eden I'm Adam!" – as both " ... aware themselves, and soon / In order, quit of all impediment" [10] – and once more by structuring the phrases right we are left with recursion at work, but a few steps up from the primordial *ab*-venture described in previous articles [12]. First of all "We may safely say that the human animal is the only creature which talks to itself. It maintains a rather constant internal dialogue in which it approves or disapproves its actions, or even itself. Its accusations and defences of itself are quite different from those in which it engages in its external dialogues. The self pities and glorifies itself as well as accuses and excuses itself. It could not carry on this dialogue without using its 'reason'; for the dialogue means that the self in one of its aspects is making the self, in another of its aspects, its object of thought. It uses conceptual images for this procedure" [13]. This new awareness is crucial, since in Edenic terms, "The mind is its own place, and in it self / Can make a Heav'n of Hell, a Hell of Heav'n" [10], as Hamlet well knew, and in this sense we can understand Yahweh's prohibition of the fruit. We shall discuss in detail below

the ways in which self-awareness is believed to be mediated by language of some kind, which “is by its very nature secret” [13], but for now we simply state that “Self-talk is defined as the ongoing dialogue we have with ourselves that determines our behaviour” [14], and after this interlude with Adam and Eve, we shall find that “The concept of the internal dialogue – and specifically the fundamental polarity between positive and negative thoughts – has historical antecedents from Plato to William James” [15]. There are important consequences of these fundamental polarities, since “In a very real sense, the initial distinction of world from self leads, through language, to a distinction of self from the world. The separation of the world leads only to a consciousness of the world and of self QUA objects in that world. Self-awareness requires a further differentiation within self – language fulfils this need” [16]. Now, regarding this awareness of self and surroundings, and of self-in-surroundings, we realize that “Our reliance on language as our primary means of communication requires that we assign word-labels to the phenomena which surround us. We then tend to refer to these phenomena by their assigned labels, as if the label *is* the phenomenon, rather than a shorthand referent. It is, of course, more convenient to say ‘That’s a cow,’ than to say, ‘That is something to which our culture, by general agreement, assigns the label ‘cow’’. In science as well, it is convenient to speak of atomic structure as if atoms are composed of protons, neutrons and electrons, even though modern physics presents a somewhat different view” [17]. And in this sense, “Confusion arises ... when we think of the labels as if they *are* the phenomena to which they refer ... We lose sight of the reality that everything other than the phenomenon is abstraction; thus the phenomenon loses some part of its experiential immediacy when ‘named’. A wall between the phenomenon and the self is erected when an image, construct, or definition is assigned” [17]. In other words we must realize that “Beyond the world and outside of language is that which confers meaning ... This ‘outside’ is the domain of the sacred, ethical and aesthetic value. There can be no genuine propositions about these values because they show themselves in what is said, and what is shown cannot (logically speaking) itself be said” [5].

And we may well then ask was Adam stuck in a rut wanting “more than his own thoughts for company,” [18], realizing that “ ... we can’t talk about much that intrigues us – natural theology, metaphysical cosmology, ethics and aesthetics – without talking nonsense” [5], and so starting to think *about* thinking? For “Towards the end of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein says: ‘There is indeed the inexpressible. This *shows* itself; it is the mystical.’ Among those things that ‘show themselves’ are ethics, aesthetics, religion, the meaning of life, logic and philosophy. In all these areas, Wittgenstein *appears* to believe, there are indeed truths, but none of these truths can be expressed in language; they all have to be shown, not said” [8]. And if we believe in the realm of “the inexpressible, the mystical” where “*omen nomen nemoni hominis [est]*” – “An omen to noone is the name of a man” we are led to ask whether “ ... a verbal enunciation, a word, a name (*nomen*), can have a performative force, conjuring the destiny (*omen*) and therefore determining the future”? [19]. The crux of the issue is that “This is precisely the point where language fails. Obviously, all language *must* be

abstraction. The limits of language *require* abstraction, since there is no way the entirety of experience can be communicated in words. Any description beyond 'is-ness', however, is culturally determined and as such constrains our perception to remain within the parameters established by our culture. While the imperatives of communication require the use of language to induce agreement about shared, or consensual reality, our experiential reality inevitably suffers as language is incorporated into our cultural mindset" [17]. Moreover, humans will insist on inventing concepts outside "consensual reality" and "Wittgenstein retained the view that moral and sacred values belong to the realm of the inexpressible ... He always held that to philosophize was not to theorise; that philosophy had no business giving explanations of a purportedly scientific sort ... but [that it was] an elucidatory activity which resulted, not in 'philosophical propositions', but in the clarification of propositions" [5]. Now, following on from this, " ... Wittgenstein stressed that philosophical problems arise for people, and he made their condition, rather than some impersonal set of concrete or abstract features, the primary focus of attention" [20]. Furthermore, "Philosophy cannot show what is said by the propositions of science. It can give no explanations, and it can make no discoveries in the sense that science does, from which it follows that we can make no mistakes in philosophy. But neither can philosophy say what is *shown* by the aesthetic, moral and sacred values which give sense to our language, although it has an inescapable tendency to do just that" [5]. We might conjecture that in his attempt to "educate himself towards independence" [21], and maybe led on by the idea that "we can make no mistakes in philosophy," even Wittgenstein himself " ... succumbed to the temptation, implicit in language itself, to 'try to grasp the essence of the thing' ... predicating of language an inner logical structure in an attempt to account for the necessity of tying language to the world" [5]. We might well concur of the *Tractatus*, therefore, that "The result is a work so enigmatic that it has been the subject of almost as many interpretations as the Bible. Bertrand Russell, Wittgenstein's teacher at Cambridge, was one of the very few to be unimpressed when the book was first published in 1953. For others, reading it has been a life-changing behaviour . I find myself fluctuating between these two extremes with each rereading" [3] – and that "In its final form, then, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* is a curious hybrid of a book, a treatise on logic *and* the expression of a deeply mystical point of view ... Russell ... was shocked at the transformation in his 'dream' student brought about by his experiences in the war. 'I had felt in his book a flavour of mysticism', he wrote to Ottoline Morrell..." [8]. It is this "mystical philosophy" or "philosophical mysticism," as applied to the question of self-awareness and creative therapeutic change that we pursue in the remainder of this article.

At this stage let us revisit Hegel's conjecture that "in order to be conscious of the world, I must at the same time be conscious of being conscious" and focus attention on the way in which we process information from the external world through a set of filters (internal, mental, emotional, verbal and perceptual), prior to forming internal representations [22]. This screening effect mediates the whole of our meta-meaning-making process (our "consciousness of being conscious") and thus the way in which we create our sense of self.

We respond to these filtered perceptions and not to a true external “reality.” We must therefore always be mindful to test our perceptions and not treat our assumptions as facts. Furthermore, if we take Kant’s stance that “We comprehend the universe only as filtered through the categories which are constitutive element of our subjectivity” [21], then we see that the “ ... split between the *Subject* of knowledge (the knower) and the *Object* of knowledge (the known) reproduces itself within the Subject itself” [21]. We frame this observation in communication theory terms by saying that individuals “ ... exist in a dynamic relation with each other and their contexts. The interrelation of their contexts (including the material conditions of life), metaprogrammes, [sets of instructions, descriptions and means of control of sets of programmes] and expectations causes them to engage in activities which are intended to satisfy needs as perceived by the people themselves. The activities result in achievements which in turn modify the metaprogrammes, act on the contexts and generate new expectations. This can be better understood as an ongoing, dynamic and cyclical process rather than a linear chain of events” [23], [24]. When Chomsky was asked about the mechanism of human reality creation – “How do you think language affects consciousness and what we experience as reality?” [25] he answered “Your guess is as good as anyone else’s. I mean, what we know is mostly by introspection, if you pay attention for, say, the next few hours, you’ll discover that you’re constantly talking to yourself. It’s almost impossible to go through a moment of time without internal dialogue taking place, and that’s just an enormous part of our consciousness, And it’s in language, most of it, at least the part that’s accessible to our consciousness is in language. How it affects our thought, and our general awareness it’s pretty hard to say. The thing is, we have no real access to thought or consciousness, except through language. So it’s hard to ask the question” [25]. The specific link between language and experience is that “We learn language by internalizing verbal labels as shorthand referents to specific matrices of our sensory input; thereafter, when a specific sensory matrix is experienced or recalled, we subvocalize its language ‘label’. It is generally assumed that, although our conversation with others [is discontinuous], we must continually maintain an internal dialogue, conversing with *ourselves*, as we internally identify or label sensory phenomena by subvocalization, using the nouns, verbs and adjectives sanctioned by our culture. This assumption that maintenance of internal dialogue is mandatory, however, limits our potentiality, since the habitual application of labels leads us to deal with the label as if it is the thing” [17] – as was indicated above. We find that “A compelling everyday example of the limitation of human potential by the application of language can be seen in the faces of children. The face of a pre-verbal child glows with the wonder of his surroundings, as do the faces of those only just introduced to language. They swim in a sea of infinite possibility ... Gradually, however, as schooling progresses and the internal dialogue becomes continuous (as society demands) the child’s face begins to close ... Finally, usually in late adolescence or early adulthood, the face reflects its owner’s conviction that, in fact, very little is possible” [17]. Indeed first-hand evidence, albeit anecdotal, is found through the fact that “Some unfortunate people suffer from brain damage that selectively interrupts inner speech. It’s as if they were under the influence of this imaginary drug. Scott Moss, a psychologist who was victim of a

stroke, lost the ability to use language. He was able to recuperate and related his experience” [26] and went on to say “I had lost the ability to converse with others ... and to engage in self-talk. In other words, I did not have the ability to think about the future – to worry, to anticipate or perceive it – at least not with words. Thus for the first four or five weeks after hospitalization I simply existed.” Morin [26] concludes that “What this quotation suggests is that inner speech makes us aware of what we are experiencing. Moss, because he was unable to talk to himself about what was happening in his mind, ‘simply existed.’ Surely he was feeling and perceiving things, but he was only vaguely – if at all – aware of his mental processes; furthermore, he was incapable of foresight.” The philosophical essence of this on the grand scale was understood by Hegel, “ ... [whose] philosophy embodies the memory of humanity as it pieces together what has been left dismembered in fragments: it is humanity struggling to take possession of the totality of its own past by seeing the story of humankind’s *self-realization* as a significant whole. Hegel’s recapitulated history of humanity’s progress reveals how consciousness is made aware of itself, thereby transforming itself into self-consciousness – or rather, consciousness is made aware that it is *already* self-conscious” [21].

And we are now truly immersed in the realms of “self-awareness” where “The term ‘self-awareness’ first needs to be carefully defined ...[it] refers to the capacity to become the object of one’s own attention [27], where the individual actively identifies, processes and stores information about the self. It is an awareness of one’s own mental states (such as perceptions, sensations, attitudes, intentions, emotions, etc.) and public self-characteristics (which include behaviors and general physical appearance)” [28]. Now Hegel claimed that “In order to be conscious of the world, I must at the same time be conscious of being conscious. Self-consciousness is ‘built in’ to consciousness. The two-way (subject/object) relation is soon complicated by the awareness that I am not alone in the world. Consciousness of self (self-consciousness in-itself) is not yet real subjectivity” [21]. Indeed “Self-consciousness, or subjectivity, is immediately a consciousness of a *lack* of something – the object. Freedom has its beginning here, in Desire. Self-consciousness is consciousness aware of its own unity and purpose. But it is also a consciousness divided, isolated from other consciousnesses. If humankind is to lead its history self-consciously, Hegel must show how individual self-consciousnesses can be related to one another in an essential way. He has to show how freedom can both divide, and ultimately also unite, human individuals” [21]. In the modern world it is claimed that the three main sources of self-awareness are the social environment (reflected appraisal, taking others’ perspective, audiences), the physical world (mirrors, video cameras, photos, books, media like TV news, programs and films) and the self (inner speech, imagery, double sensory stimulation) [28] and it can certainly be mooted that many of these mechanisms can act “to divide, and ultimately also unite, human individuals.” It is proposed that the crucial link between context in which human beings operate, the “metaprogrammes” controlling their actions, and their expectations of the future, is mediated through language and “Wittgenstein argues that all our knowledge of the world, all that we think about, talk about and so on, is gained out of experience, interaction and action, i.e. is gained out of

linguistic processes within the environment” [24]. The problem with this restriction on our knowledge is that “In this and other ways, our everyday language disguises the underlying logical form of the thoughts it is used to express. Philosophy, Wittgenstein believes ... is, for the most part, a series of problems that have arisen because of the confusion caused by this disguise. In this way, it can often help to re-express thoughts in the kind of artificial, formal languages invented by Frege and Russell” [8]. One critical consequence of the fact “all knowledge we gain of the world is gained linguistically” is the observation that “One can have no existence as a (social) human being outside of a social framework and the social framework is constantly mediated by shared language and that in the long run that there can be no private language that would have any communicative function. My understanding of myself, i.e. my identity, is disclosed by my interactions. I do not exist as an island – ‘no one is an island’” [24]. This is an idea which is central to Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument and the mystico-philosophical debate it raises as to whether there can be any “private language that would have any communicative function” – and if so what that function, or indeed the usefulness of the debate itself, would be – is expounded in great detail later. We can thus postulate that the observable effect of our languaging on the external, and thus reflexively on our internal, worlds is that “ ... one cannot enter an environment without effecting it in some way. Effect is interaction, or at least will lead to interaction or the avoidance of interaction which is itself a kind of interaction. To reach some sort of state of ‘objectivity’ within an environment is impossible. The failure to recognise this illusory nature of language will inevitably lead to bad results ... This argument suggests that one cannot gain information from a system without entering into it and acting upon it, in some way altering the conditions of the system, if only by talking about it” [24]. Languaging thus exerts a kind of ironic magic on our self-reflexive existence since “There is no subjectivity or objectivity. The presence of the observer within the environment being observed, or even outside the environment being observed, alters the process going on in that environment” [24]. The overall result of this is that “It follows that, if our usual or ordinary reality is a construct arising from our own internal dialogue as we interpret our sensory input, then, since each of our dialogues must be the unique result of the sum of our individual experience, there is no way we can share a totally agreed-upon mutual reality” [17]. The nature and results of this uncertain communicative self-languaging process is creating, maintaining and changing human realities, are explored in great detail in the next article [29].

How can we summarize the role of internal dialogue in personal individuation? Well, “One potential function of inner speech is its role in self-awareness and the acquisition of self-information ... When one talks to oneself one can verbally identify, process and store data about one’s current physical and mental states as well as past or present behaviours” [28]. Another view “ ... suggests that a person becomes aware of a mental state when the individual generates a higher-order thought about that state. This position is congruent with the present proposal: we become self-aware when we engage in self-talk (higher-order thought) about our current mental states and personal characteristics ... this relationship most

likely is bidirectional ... Inner speech itself also depends upon self-awareness, or at least consciousness: one has to be awake and conscious in order to talk to oneself. Moreover, without a conscious subjective experience the self would not have much to talk about" [28]. So, let us turn now to Schoeder's analysis and interpretation of one of the earliest discussions of "intrapersonal communication" from Antiquity, Plato's *Theaetetus*, quoted at the beginning of this article, wherein "Socrates claims that thought is a process in which 'discussion' takes place within the soul. Thought dialogic as well as linguistic; this can be contrasted to a theory of thought either more akin to a 'monologue,' or imagistic. Whereas Plato's dialogues are external between two or more individuals, the implication of the passage above is that a corresponding 'internal dialogue' of the same form exists" [30]. We can compare this with Kant's comprehension that "Self-consciousness – the awareness that '*I think*' – arises in understanding's recognition or *apperception* that it is entirely separate from imagination, yet already implicated within, and generative of, its processes. [Kant writes:] '*I call it pure apperception ... because it is that self-consciousness which, while generating the representation '*I think*' ... cannot itself be accompanied by any further representation.'* Understanding obtains the right to apply its concepts to all objects of possible experience through reason's 'Ideas' which go beyond the possibility of experience" [31]. The specific language used by Plato to describe this was that "External dialogue is composed of statements (*logos*), which differ from judgments (*doxa*) ... [Elsewhere] Socrates uses *dianoia* to refer to thought, not *doxa*. Although both *doxa* and *dianoia* can be translated as 'thought', the distinction between the two seems to be in the degree to which a thought has been affirmed as a judgment (*doxa*), rather than just as thoughts (*dianoia*) ... If thought is isomorphic with external dialogue, then it will also require individuals to have multiple view points. Judgment is the result of internal dialogue, since discussion is generally directed at reaching a judgment. There is also a distinction between 'statement' and 'judgment', since statements do not occur internally, 'silently addressed to oneself', whereas judgments do" [30]. The important inference of this distinction is that " ... thought is linguistic as well as dialogic, rather than imagistic, as Aristotle and others will later argue. The translation of perception into specifically *linguistic* terms grounds judgment; thus, it seems that rationality and judgment are necessarily tied to language use, if not defined by language use. The notion of thought as *dialogic* might at first seem paradoxical, since dialogue requires two interlocutors and an individual generally contains only a single position ... [However, it is possible to] argue otherwise, considering the possibility that thought need not be limited to the contemplation of a single position" [30]. Thus the upshot is that even when "thinking to oneself" – "Conversation becomes a paradigm. Even when one is engaged in silent reflection, the model Plato looks to is that in which two people secure agreement before moving ahead" [32], in other words, "Dialogue is not merely an activity between individuals, but also the foundation of thought" [30]. If we resite this understanding in terms of Socrates' dialogue, then we realize that "Theaetetus stands before his own speaking as if it were a foreign tongue. If to opine and to think are the soul's silent versions of to speak and to converse, then one can genuinely opine if and only if one has gone through the thinking that has resulted in a

conclusion” [33]. Kant can also be interpreted in the similar terms since “In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Understanding possessed a ‘consciousness’ of its inability to form a consciousness of the ‘thing in itself’ (noumenon). The ‘thing in itself’ resided in a site beyond Understanding’s consciousness. The very absence of the ‘thing in itself’ allowed Understanding to form a consciousness or representation of something outside itself: the faculty of Reason. Hence, Reason became the means for mediating between Understanding and the ‘thing in itself’. In other words, Understanding’s consciousness of the absence of the ‘thing in itself’ was, in fact, a consciousness of the *absence of Reason*” [31].

And there are also overtones of therapy and the physician or midwife in the Theaetetic dialogue as noted by Polansky [34] who could be summarized as stating that “The reference to midwifery suggests that Socrates aims not only to help Theaetetus express his ideas, but also to produce an inner dialogue within Theaetetus in which those ideas arise. For an external dialogue to result in knowledge, it would begin as external, and later become internalized by the speakers, who would reach a judgment, followed by a reinterpretation into external dialogue, in which the knowledge claims could be discussed” [30]. Moreover, “Polansky furthers these questions of the relationship between internal and external dialogue. He holds that internal dialogue is deeper and richer, since it takes into account the dialogic process with which it arrived at its solution, whereas externalized ‘statement’ reduces the process to a single, propositional statement ...” [30]. We contrast this with the analysis of McCabe [35] who “... claims that internal dialogue cannot contain the depth of external dialogue, since internal dialogue lacks two distinct interlocutors, each of whom holds his or her position to be true. McCabe questions the specific use of the dialectic form, claiming the choice of dialectic represents an ideal form of thought ... She goes on to claim that this is only a model, and that this is a prescriptive claim regarding what the best type of process would be, but may not in fact represent how beliefs are actually formed ... While such a model might provide *better* judgments, it remains prescriptive; the focus remains on what discourse *should* be, rather than how it actually functions” [30]. In Kantian terms we are “... forced to circumscribe Understanding’s so-called ‘consciousness’. Basically, this ‘consciousness must not be seen to form itself into an absolute representation, for if it were to do this it would fall back into a metaphysical contradiction. If we want to save freedom, no other way remains but to attribute causality to the appearance and freedom to the thing in itself. Freedom functions in terms of an Idea of Reason as *noumenon* (thing in itself), whilst Understanding’s continuous yet futile search for an objective principle governing freedom is situated in the realm of appearances and illusion” [31].

Now the thrust of these arguments leads to the proposal of a formal structural relationship or isomorphism between thought and language, and “The notion that thought is of a similar form as external dialogue grounds further discussion. The isomorphism is implicit in Socrates’ claims that: ‘the soul when it thinks is simply carrying on a discussion in which it asks itself questions and answers them itself, affirms and denies’” [30]. Now, “The way that thought is

described suggests that internal dialogue there is one activity (dialogue) which can take place, either between two individuals, or within an individual. Either way, the same activity is taking place, and thus internal and external dialogue can be thought of as isomorphic" [30]. Let us now pause to compare and contrast internal and external "dialogue," and we find that "... the difference will lie in the fact that for externalized dialogue there will be two interlocutors, whereas for silent dialogue this will take place within a single individual. In a certain sense, in order to truly be a 'dialogue,' there will still be two opposed positions, despite the lack of two distinct individuals. Thus, one of the central features must be that a silent discussion consists of an individual engaging at least two positions in discussion. This demands the capacity of an individual to, if not actually hold two beliefs, recognize the possibility that either of two positions might be a solution to a problem" [30]. We thus recognize that "The goal of most dialogic exchanges is to come to an agreement, which one may not have been able to reach alone; however, as demonstrated in the majority of Plato's dialogues, agreement does not always result. Although judgment is achieved when the soul, 'affirms one thing consistently and without divided counsel' ... dialogue is not sufficient for judgment. Instead, most of the dialogues do not end in the affirmation of 'one thing' alone – dialectical inquiry need not lead to agreement. What is central to dialogic exchange, therefore, is not judgment, but the exchange of two opposing positions with the goal of reaching a consensus or attaining knowledge" [30]. Furthermore, we can question the causal relationship between internal and external dialogue – "... whether internal dialogue is a reflection of externalized dialogue, or if external dialogue is a reflection of internal dialogue or some other relationship. Later, Socrates describes 'account' as: 'making one's thought apparent vocally by means of words and verbal expressions – when a man impresses the image of his judgment upon the stream of speech, like a reflection upon water or in a mirror' ... While this understanding of 'account' is not ultimately successful, the conception of the relationship between thought and language remains relevant to our discussion. Here speech is a reflection of thought, suggesting thought precedes speech. Polansky notes that a circularity arises since ... [one section] describes thought in terms of speech ... [whilst another] describes speech in terms of thought. It is not, however, problematic" [30]. In summary we find that "Thought and speech are linked and each seems necessary to understand the other. Thought is necessary for speech on this account, but speech clarifies thought in a way that thought alone cannot. While thought precedes speech, we can only understand thought through speech. For Polansky [34], thought and speech are distinguished by the degree of expression each contains. Thought might be described as occurring as a sort of proto-language, which operates much like a language, but lacks the clarity or solidity of a spoken language" [30]. For Plato, the nature of the thought-language relationship is that "Thought and language are not simply isolated incidents of discourse, but rather each is necessary to complete the other. If thought is translated into speech, its translation into an expressible statement clarifies and solidifies it. Yet, the danger in this translation is that the statement may lose the depth and profundity that it contained as a thought ... [34]. This objection does not seem problematic – rather, the profundity lost is replaced by the opportunity to pose the claim against another claim in

externalized dialogue. Although the process that produced the internal judgment is not evident in the resulting statement, externalized dialogue may provide objections that the internal dialogue did not" [30].

And herein lies hidden a crucial point – the necessary openendedness of the dialogical dialectic, for "Since there can be any number of objections as a result of external dialogue, there will never be any clear end of them dialectical process. Thus, we reach another central element of dialogic exchange: open endedness. What distinguishes dialectical inquiry from a dogmatic approach is the notion that any claim is open to objection, and further investigation. Thus, no knowledge claim can be grounded in absolute certainty, but rather will always be a potential object of an objection, internal or external. As we move from thought to the implications on knowledge, this issue will play a key role in determining how a dialogic theory of thought will impact the resultant theory of knowledge" [30]. In terms of such epistemology we can define the relationship between knowledge and judgment as follows – "Despite the lack of any positive definition of knowledge, given its internal status, and its relationship to judgment and thought, it follows that we can consider knowledge as both a type of thought as well as a type of judgment. If knowledge is a form of thought, then judgment is a type of thought aimed at knowledge. Although judgment is not sufficient for knowledge, it is a necessary condition. Socrates distinguishes between 'thought' as: 'simply carrying on a discussion in which it asks itself questions and answers them itself, affirms and denies,' ... whereas judgment occurs: 'when it arrives at something definite, either by a gradual process or a sudden leap, when it affirms one thing consistently and without divided counsel' ... Thoughts occur in the mind, but judgments only do so through this dialectical process, suggesting that judgment is directed at truth. Since knowledge is a type of judgment, it will be the result of a process such as the one described above" [30]. However there is a crucial consequence of "knowledge as a type of judgment," as identified by Nails who realised that "When a dialogue ends without claiming certainty, one does not then go back, looking for hidden clues to Plato's real opinion on the matter. One may well go back to try to increase one's understanding of the issue under discussion, but that is a different enterprise altogether" [36] and moreover "Plato sets his characters to argue forcefully for a number of doctrines, yet discussion is never closed, and the production of dogma is not the goal" [36]. The importance of this "different enterprise altogether" is that "Nails' interpretation also suggests that Plato's work is not interested in *solving* philosophical problems, but rather *presenting* problems. It is unlikely that Plato would still be relevant at all, had he written in a treatise form ... Thus, the form of the dialogues itself denies a dogmatic interpretation, in support of an open-ended (or 'double-openended') reading of Plato" [30]. If we set *Tractatus* alongside *Theaetetus*, "unravelling the threads" of Wittgenstein's "clear-as-mud" aphorisms and comparing these with Plato's "undogmatic, double-open-ended" dialogues, the philosophico-mystical similarity should become apparent.

We come now to the question of the privileged "process" nature of internal dialogue, whereby

“The process of transferring an internal judgment to an externalized statement transforms a judgment into a proposition, however, judgment involves more. Polansky argues that the transition from judgment to statement denies the judgment of the original depth that it contained ... For Polansky [34], internal dialogue is privileged, since it contains a greater depth, rather than remaining at the level of simply expressing the resulting *opinion* of the internal dialectical process. Thus, Polansky values internal dialogue over external dialogue insofar as only internal dialogue can display the full depth implicit in the *process* of coming to a judgment, whereas the externalization of the judgment simply becomes statement” [30]. The exact nature of this internal procedure is that “Opinion (or judgment) is the result of an internal dialogue, which differs from speaking the words out loud. I can fairly easily speak words that I do not hold to be true or meaningful, even have a discussion in which I do not hold any of the words I am saying to be true (think of someone reading from a script in a language that he or she can only speak, but not understand.) In none of these instances does *speaking* words imply that the speaker believes them to be true. I cannot make a judgment that those words are true, unless I have internalized their meaning” [30]. If we now consider the *form* of this knowledge then we reach the important conclusion that “Perhaps there is a ... sense in which knowledge is non-propositional for Plato. The objects of propositional knowledge may not, in fact, be what Plato intends by knowledge at all. That is, although Socrates’ questions tend to be of the form ‘What is X?’ and in general the responses will be propositional (‘X is Y’), as in the Theaetetus, the reason that they fail is that what is intended cannot be contained within propositional frame” [30]. This is because “Predication requires the predication of something, whereas Socrates seems to be looking for something definitional. Even a definition would seem inadequate due to the regress since the other terms must also be defined. While I do not want to import Forms into this discussion ... whatever Socrates is looking for would be of the same form as knowledge of Forms would. Knowledge would, it seems, not be propositional at all, but be able to recognize the essence of a concept. There would be an internal understanding, which need not translate into the ability to produce an externalized proposition” [30]. And as a negative example of this then we can follow Gonzalez who believes that “If Socrates thinks that what virtue is cannot be defined, that a definition could never state more than how virtue is qualified, and if he wishes to hint at this view without explicitly affirming it, then we should expect him to do exactly what he does” [37]. And in this sense we regain the Kantian viewpoint that “ ... the territory of pure understanding is the ‘land of truth’. However, it is also ‘the native home of illusion, where many a fog bank and many a swiftly melting iceberg give the deceptive appearance of farther shores, deluding the adventurous seafarer ever anew with empty hopes’. Illusions continually obstruct understanding’s reflexive capacity, leading it to confuse the power to *realize* consciousness with the power to *control* consciousness. [Kant explains that:] ‘False ideas arise as a consequence of an improper consideration of reason’s Ideas’” [31].

And as soon as we steer our minds in this direction, trying to avoid the “fog banks and swiftly melting icebergs of illusion” we find ourselves in a “*meta-position*” with respect to

communication and need language to talk about language. We can illustrate the language-metalanguage distinction by considering as an example the sentence: "In saying: 'geraravit' he was slurring four words into one" [38]. To analyse what is going on here we recognise that "Such an assertion is an assertion about words. Since all assertions are *in* words, such an assertion makes use of words to say something about words. Most assertions, on the other hand, make use of words to say something about almost anything except words. In the present terminology: most assertions of everyday speech are not metalinguistic" [38]. Despite the fact that "The distinction here is one quite commonly used in ordinary speech" [38], we must exercise caution from the outset as we can certainly postulate that "Everyday language users, using words such as 'language', 'meaning', and 'rule', do not, ... sit down over coffee to use their unexamined language to discuss the question: 'Can a meaning possibly be assigned to a symbol in a private potential language?'. That is not the kind of question for which everyday language has been devised. The area, if it exists, would be unusual" [39]. Of course, Wittgenstein, in the *Tractatus*, phrased this thus: "In everyday language it very frequently happens that the same word has different modes of signification – and so belongs to different symbols – or that two words that have different modes of signification are employed in propositions in what is superficially the same way" [9]. So, to take Wittgenstein's example: "Thus the word 'is' figures as the copula, as a sign for identity, and as an expression for existence; 'exist' figures as an intransitive verb like 'go', and 'identical' as an adjective; we speak of *something*, but also of *something's* happening" [9]. And as an aside – "In the proposition 'Green is green' – where the first word is the proper name of a person and the last an adjective – these words do not merely have different meanings: they are *different symbols*." [9]. Of course "This is a problem, not for ordinary language-users, but for philosophers, who tend not to notice that their questions are the result of not seeing clearly enough the logic of our language. So, for example, if you are aware that the word 'is' can be used to express predication ('Green is green'), then no confusion need be caused. If you are not aware of this, then you will make the 'grave mistakes' made by philosophers ... " [8]. In summary, Wittgenstein thought that "... In this way the most fundamental confusions are easily produced (the whole of philosophy is full of them) ... In order to avoid such errors we must make use of a sign-language that excludes them by not using the same sign for different symbols and by not using in a superficially similar way signs that have different modes of signification: that is to say, a sign-language that is governed by *logical* grammars – by logical syntax" [9]. In this sense, "An unusual area, with substantial issues, may exist. We may not presuppose that it does not. Philosophers *may* have been imagining, thinking about, and discussing, a genuine, unusual, area ... " [thonemanm]. Given this warning, however, we can still proceed with our "philosophical investigations," bearing in mind that "I then need to be careful to explain meanings for any everyday words which I am extrapolating into this area – and to say which other everyday words I judge not to be appropriate" [39]. We can imagine that "I proceed like a Physicist, who is careful to explain that 'weight' and 'amount' are going to be used with adjusted, extrapolated, meanings ... " [39]. The importance of "taking care to explain meanings" and "saying which others are inappropriate" is illustrated in detail in the

arguments below. On the other hand, “Substantial issues, in an unusual area, may *not* exist. They may indicate illusory depth, generated by Philosophers removing everyday words from their usual contexts, and placing them in unusual combinations; the cogs fail to mesh; language goes on holiday” [39] – now, in this latter case, “ ... when I use more carefully explained words to try to express problems in the putative area, I should find that the problems dissolve; I should find that there is *no* unusual area – just grammatically-induced confusion” [39]. Thus we arrive at the situation wherein “ ... by carelessly taking usual words beyond the limits of the area they were intended for, by taking them on holiday ... that the cogs that should usually mesh to make language mean something are running free” [39] – and in this situation, the philosopher’s “ ... proposal can be eliminated by careful attention to the usual uses of the words involved; examples from everyday use – presentation of facts about everyday linguistic use – will expose its nonsensical quality” [39]. Contrary to this we must beware of philoposhical “Ordinary Linguagism” [39] whereby if the philosopher’s argument “ ... involves many usual words, but – because of the unusual area intended – using some with *adjusted meanings*, and perhaps some special new words (technical terms). If so, for his critic to try and eliminate his proposal by insisting on using his words in the usual way, against his intentions, and hence triumphantly demonstrating that the philosopher’s claims are inconsistent with normal usage, is unsound arguing” [39]. This latter extension of unsound reasoning is widespread, and “Its influence is pernicious” [39]. The problem with this observation, however, is that “The exposure of Ordinary Linguagism is disappointing for a critic impatient with metaphysics – impatient to expose much historical and contemporary philosophy as [the] nonsense he is intuitively sure it is” [39]. For example “Any tough-minded engineer would balk at ‘The Good is more identical than the Beautiful’, feel that it is clearly nonsense, and feel that all we need is to find the simple method for demonstrating this” [39]. However, despite this desire, it remains the case that “Verificationism failed to provide an algorithm for demonstrating nonsense, and so does Ordinary Linguagism” [39]. In negotiating these discussions we must be careful “ ... not be misled by this into thinking (a) that there is such a thing as a ‘correct’ sign-language or (b) that there is anything wrong with the language we have. The problem with our everyday language is not that it is inadequate to express our thoughts, nor that it stands in need of improvement in order to express thoughts more precisely ... the problem is that it does not, so to speak, wear its own logical form on its sleeve” [8].

In this context, where “the cogs fail to mesh; language goes on holiday” it is of great interest to modern therapeutic practice to note “ ... Wittgenstein’s insistence that philosophical work be re-conceived as a form of treatment, a therapeutic discipline” [20], and that his approach to this work falls into two parts – “The first acknowledges that philosophy can induce conditions which *call* for treatment; the second prescribes philosophy as a treatment. What neither suggest is that philosophy might be *both* the condition and the prescription ... “ [20]. Moreover “There are some arguments in Wittgenstein’s later work, but not enough for the taste of most professional philosophers. In most cases, Wittgenstein does not offer an

argument, but rather a kind of *therapy*" [8]. In this sense Wittgenstein's perception may be seen as mirroring that of Hegel who claimed "My philosophy included a schizophrenic principle of self-division, negation, contradiction, but its ultimate aim ... is one of reconciliation and harmony" [21], and who "... suggested that therapy had to be dialectical: it had to involve sympathizing with the patient's complaints, winning the trust of the disturbed. It would involve respecting the patient's rational personality while at the same time overcoming the one-sidedness and abstraction of the patient's 'fixed idea'" [21]. Furthermore "The way that Wittgenstein now proposes to clear up philosophical confusion bears some similarities to Freudian psychoanalysis. ('The philosopher's treatment of a problem is like a doctor's treatment of an illness')" [8] and "In his conversations and lectures, Wittgenstein drew attention to the analogy between his philosophical method and Freud's psychological methods, even to the extent of describing himself as a 'disciple of Freud'. However, he had no sympathy with Freud's own conception of his achievement, according to which he had created a new *science* of psychology" [8]. The reason for this is that "For Wittgenstein, it was absolutely vital to realize that Freud had *not* given us a set of scientific explanations for, e.g., dreams and neuroses. His achievement was much greater than *that*, for what Freud had given us, according to Wittgenstein, was a new *mythology*, a new way of looking at ourselves and the people around us, a way that allowed us to see connections between things that we had not seen before" [8]. So it is safe to say that "The therapy simile is evidently an important thread in the knot ... " [20], and that "Work on philosophy – like work *in* architecture in many respects – is really more work on oneself. On one's own conception. On how one sees things (And what one expects of them)" [40]. Thus "... the significance of philosophical investigation lies in the kind of self-understanding it produces. The best, or perhaps the only, way of becoming acquainted with the background framework of our own thoughts is to be made thoroughly aware of the different frameworks which have created and sustained the thoughts of others" [20]. And perhaps this need "to be made thoroughly aware of the different frameworks which have created and sustained the thoughts of others" is the reason why Wittgenstein's later investigations "... progress by means of multiform dialogue, questions and replies and assertions that issue from what is, and not just on a first reading, a bewildering array of different voices giving vent to different convictions, prejudices and philosophical temptations, voices that are sometimes stirred, sometimes stilled, by an underlying flow of argument that is not always plainly perceptible" [20].

The link between philosophico-therapy and a very peculiar form of languaging can be made at this point, for "Interestingly, he [Wittgenstein] was prepared to allow that when someone discusses their apparently meaningless scribbles with a psychoanalyst and is brought to accept an interpretation of them, 'we may then refer to the doodling as a kind of writing, as using a kind of language, *although it was not understood by anyone*' [41]" [20]. The peculiar way in which this new form of language arises is that "... we purchase the license to refer to doodling as the use of a language, though it is not understood by anyone at the time of writing, because the analyst can draw out of people an explanation of why they wrote what

they did by asking particular kinds of question and tracing out revealing associations. Whether or not we think of the analyst's explanations of the doodling as proceeding by the application of the particular kinds of law to which scientific explanation appeals (and Wittgenstein evidently did not) is no matter. The point is that the process is sufficiently constrained and informed by rules to justify, rationalize and elucidate the explanation which the analyst and patient agree on so that they can say *why* they agree on it" [5]. The statement that "that the process is sufficiently constrained and informed by rules to justify, rationalize and elucidate the explanation which the participants agree on so that they can say *why* they agree" leads us directly to Wittgenstein's framework for philosophico-linguistic therapy, since "This model, then, represents language as being an entirely superficial phenomenon. It forbids us to attribute to it any occult depths or concealed structures. Anything we need to learn about it can be learned by attending to features of the map-like surface, immediately available for inspection. Inscribed on this surface is an extraordinarily complex network of structures which interweave and link up with one another in a bewildering variety of ways. The map, moreover, is to be thought of as constantly changing in respect of both its outermost borders and the internal arrangement of its constituent parts. These latter are rule-governed structures or language-games" [5]. Now in terms of Monk's definition, "A language game is a (usually fictitious) primitive form of language in which one particular aspect of our ordinary language – say the role of names – is highlighted by being separated from the complicated contexts in which it is usually embedded. The idea is that we will be able to 'see the connection' between the simplified case and language as it is used in real life" [8]. The concept is so revolutionary and central to his work, that Wittgenstein himself explains at length that "I shall in future again and again draw your attention to what I shall call language games. These are ways of using signs simpler than those in which we use the signs of our highly complicated everyday language. Language games are the forms of language with which a child begins to make use of words. The study of language games is the study of primitive forms of language or primitive languages. If we want to study the problems of truth and falsehood, of the agreement and disagreement of propositions with reality, of the nature of assertion, assumption, and question, we shall with great advantage look at primitive forms of language in which these forms of thinking appear without the confusing background of highly complicated processes of thought. When we look at such simple forms of language the mental mist which seems to enshroud our ordinary use of language disappears. We see activities, reactions, which are clear-cut and transparent. On the other hand we recognize in these simple processes forms of language not separated by a break from our more complicated ones. We see that we can build up the complicated forms from the primitive ones by gradually adding new forms" [42]. Now, the best way to come to an understanding of the concept of the so-called "language-game" is to play one, since "To understand a language-game is to be capable of playing it, and to play a language-game is to participate in a rule-guided activity in which others could in principle participate, even if, as a matter of fact, nobody else actually does. For the rules which make up the boundaries of the game are public standards. Thus there can be no private games because there can be no private rules,

although there can be games with only one player. Finally, to think about a language-game is to think about one of the forms which human social life – but only human life – may take” [5]. Now at this stage there are three reasons to pause and reflect cautiously on what we have put forward so far – the first is the realization that “ ... the ‘language-game’ conceit is a term of art that is doubtless open to abuse. Its great strength, which lies in the extensive range of its possible applications, is also what makes it dangerous. Yet its advantages surely outweigh its capacity to lead us astray. The metaphor captures the rule-governed and structured nature of language as well as its complexity and capacity for growth and decay, while reminding us always that language is an activity or class of activities, united to one another through shades of resemblance. There is unity, therefore, in the diversity of language games” [5]. The second is that “Clearly, Wittgenstein does not intend this invented language game to mirror reality in all its complexity, but neither would he claim to have presented any aspect of language ‘in its essence’ ... No, this fictitious, in some ways utterly unrealistic, scenario is designed to present *some* aspects of our language in a way that is more primitive than that in which they appear in our everyday lives. And the point of that is to enable us to see more clearly than we would otherwise do some features of our language that we might otherwise overlook” [8]. The third is the assertion that “there can be no private games because there can be no private rules” – which lies at the heart of the so-called “Private Language Argument” – and which is explored in depth in its relation to the possibility of intrapersonal communication below. The crux of the matter is that “ ... *this* is what Wittgenstein hoped to achieve with the method of inventing language games. He hoped that they might play a useful role in the ‘therapy’ required to get a philosopher to acknowledge that his or her philosophical theory is just a confusion built upon a misconception” [8].

And now we can make the link between our internal dialogue and the idea of “philosophical therapy” or “therapeutic philosophy” as conceptualized above, in terms of the modern Western philosophical debate about the possibility of a “*lingua occulta*” or “Private Language” sparked off by Wittgenstein in his *Philosophical Investigations*. Herein, Wittgenstein begins by recognizing that “A human being can encourage himself, give himself orders, obey, blame and punish himself; he can ask himself a question and answer it. We could even imagine human beings who spoke only in monologue; who accompanies their activities by talking to themselves. – An explorer who watched them and listened to their talk might succeed in translating their language into ours. (This would enable him to predict these people’s actions correctly, for he also hears them making resolutions and decisions.)” [43]. He then goes on to ask “But could we also imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences – his feelings, moods, and the rest – for his private use? – Well, can’t we do so in our ordinary language? – But that is not what I mean. The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language” [43]. And specifically taking the example of physical sensations, he poses the question: “How do words *refer* to sensations? – There doesn’t seem to be any problem here; don’t we talk about

sensations every day, and give them names? But how is the connection between the name and the things named set up? This question is the same as: how does a human being learn the meaning of names of sensations? – of the word ‘pain’ for example. Here is one possibility: words are connected with the primitive, the natural, expressions of the sensation used in their place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behaviour. ‘So are you saying that the word ‘pain’ really means crying? – On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it ... For how can I go so far as to try to use language to get between pain and its expression?’ [43]. In other words, Wittgenstein wants to know “In what sense are my sensations *private*? – Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it. – In one way this is wrong, and in another nonsense. If we are using the word ‘to know’ as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know when I am in pain. – Yes, but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it myself! – It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I *know* I am in pain. What is this supposed to mean – except perhaps that I *am* in pain? Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations *only* from my behaviour – for I cannot be said to learn of them. I *have* them. The truth is: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself” [43]. This set of questions and musings has become known as the “Private Language Argument”, the crux of which is given in Section 243 of *Philosophical Investigations* where Wittgenstein states of a putative “Private Language” that “The words of this language are to refer to what can be known only to the speaker; to his immediate, private, sensations. So another cannot understand the language” ([43] from Candlish’s translation in [44]). At this point, though, we must draw a distinction since the term “Private Language” in this sense “... is not intended to cover (easily imaginable) cases of recording one’s experiences in a personal code, for such a code, however obscure in fact, could in principle be deciphered” [44]. Rather, we are imagining is “... a language conceived as *necessarily* comprehensible only to its single originator because the things which define its vocabulary are necessarily inaccessible to others” [44]. Of course what we do *not* mean when raising the questions of Adam’s self-speech; or the divinations of the dreamer’s doodlings; or, incidentally, the generation of a metalanguage; is “A *private language* [that] is an exclusive language intelligible only to a restricted group of people” [45]. Such restricted languages are well-known, “...[they] are found in many cultures and subcultures. The ‘in-group’ may be large or small” [45]. As examples we find that “Language codes are a form of private language. The Navajo ‘code talkers’ baffled Japanese eavesdroppers in World War II, as by using Navajo bird names for warplanes. Another example is *cant*, the private language of the underworld, the secret slang of beggars, thieves, etc. Even teenage slang and technical jargon can be considered private languages” [45]. There are several obvious reasons for using them: “... to maintain secrecy; to distinguish group members from outsiders; or just to have fun ...” [45]. Such restricted languages have various common features and “Some private languages are fairly intelligible, while others are completely opaque. Private languages sometimes invent new vocabulary

and grammar ... *idioglossia* ... is a form of private language invented by one child or by children in close contact. It's been said that 40% of twins develop some form of private speech" [45]. And as always, we have to take care with our concepts, as, for example, discussing Wittgenstein's example of involving "pain" above – since, "The language of feelings is not a private language; it is more a system of symbols, a language game that is understood by those who have learned its conventions and usages. Emotions treated in a poem are neither the projections of the reader's own mental states nor the private feelings of the poet; rather, they are the objective situations abiding in the poem as its cognitive content" [46]. Furthermore, "Consistent with this point is [the fact] that ... Wittgenstein suggests that one cannot arrive at the idea of a private language by considering a natural language: natural languages are not private, for our sensations are expressed. But neither can we arrive at the idea by starting with a natural language and just subtracting from it all expression of sensations (temporary paralysis is clearly not in question)" [44]. Indeed, "Naming one's sensation requires a place for the new word: that is, a notion of sensation. The attempt to name a sensation in a conceptual vacuum merely raises the questions of what this business is supposed to consist in, and what is its *point*. But, for the sake of getting to the heart of the matter, Wittgenstein puts the first of these questions on one side and pretends that it is sufficient for the second to imagine himself in the position of establishing a private language for the purpose of keeping a diary of his sensations" [44]. We go on to investigate the "point" of a Private Language in terms of its consistency and value below.

The monumental importance of Wittgenstein's work in this area is explained by Monk who states that "The 'Private Language Argument' has become the best known and the most celebrated section of *Philosophical Investigations*. So impressed are some philosophers by this argument that they regard its conclusion – that there can be no such thing as a private language – as the nearest thing philosophy has ever had to a 'result' (in the sense in which a proven theorem might in logic or mathematics is a 'result')" [8]; and in fact "Some people hold that its target is the entire tradition of Western philosophy from the early modern period inaugurated by Descartes to the middle of the twentieth century. Indeed, Wittgenstein's greatest achievement, it is often said, was to have undone 300 years of Cartesianism" [8]. Another way of putting it is that the Private Language Argument " ... is meant to bring to consciousness otherwise hidden illusions that have pernicious effects on our thinking, dissolving questions that have obsessed philosophers throughout recent history of philosophy, curing us of the kinds of mental cramp which explain why that history is driven by misdirected or superficial questions and guided by a distorted view of the facts ... " [20]. Nevertheless we must take care for " ... there is some controversy about what the 'Private Language Argument' is, which sections of the book contain it, and what, exactly, it is designed to establish" [8], and "... most of the section that is more conventionally regarded as the 'Private Language Argument' does not seem to centre on an argument at all; rather, it seems to be a mixed bag of bald assertions, metaphors, wry jokes and exercises of the imagination" [8], containing "... attempts to approach from a variety of different angles various

assumptions about private, 'inner' experience that are customarily made by professional philosophers and ordinary people alike" [8]. So, where can we sensibly begin the discussion of the nature of internal communication on a firm footing?

The whole crux of the Private Language Argument revolves around the thesis that "A private language is self-contradictory (incoherent) because assigning private meaning to a symbol – making meaning – is impossible" [39]. However, there is more at stake than this conclusion, since "The importance of drawing philosophers' attention to a largely unheard-of notion and then arguing that it is unrealizable lies in the fact that an unformulated reliance on the possibility of a private language is arguably essential to mainstream epistemology, philosophy of mind and metaphysics from Descartes to versions of the representational theory of mind which became prominent in late twentieth century cognitive science" [44]. Moreover, "Wittgenstein suggests that the existence of the rules governing the use of language and making communication possible depends on agreement in human behaviour – such as the uniformity in normal human reaction which makes it possible to train most children to look at something by pointing at it. (Unlike cats, which react in a seemingly random variety of ways to pointing.) One function of the private language argument is to show that not only actual languages but the very possibility of language and concept formation depends on the possibility of such agreement" [44]. And, going even further, "Another, related, function is to oppose the idea that metaphysical absolutes are within our reach, that we can find at least part of the world as it really is in the sense that any other way of conceiving that part must be wrong" [44]. There are also implications with respect to sensations, where " ... the parallel temptation is to suppose that they are self-intimating. Itching, for example, seems like this: one just feels what it is directly; if one then gives the sensation a name, the rules for that name's subsequent use are already determined by the sensation itself" [44]. In fact, "Wittgenstein tries to show that this impression is illusory, that even itching derives its identity only from a sharable practice of expression, reaction and use of language" [44]. For, "If itching were a metaphysical absolute, forcing its identity upon me in the way described, then the possibility of such a shared practice would be irrelevant to the concept of itching: the nature of itching would be revealed to me in a single mental act of naming it (the kind of mental act which Russell called 'acquaintance'); all subsequent facts concerning the use of the name would be irrelevant to how that name was meant; and the name could be private" [44]. The Private Language Argument tries to show that " ... such subsequent facts could not be irrelevant, that no names could be private, and that the notion of having the true identity of a sensation revealed in a single act of acquaintance is a confusion" [44]. Wittgenstein's argument can also be read as targeting " ... the confusions ... [that] underlie a range of articulated philosophical notions and theories, without themselves being so articulated ... For example, a still very common idea, often attributed to John Locke and openly embraced by Jerry Fodor in the nineteen seventies, is that interpersonal spoken communication works by speakers' translation of their internal mental vocabularies into sounds followed by hearers' re-translation into their own internal vocabularies" [44]. This is particularly evidenced in the

philosophy of Descartes who “ ... considered himself able to talk to himself about his experiences while claiming to be justified in saying that he does not know (or not until he has produced a reassuring philosophical argument) anything at all about an external world conceived as something independent of them. And he and others have thought: while I may make mistakes about the external world, I can infallibly avoid error if I confine my judgments to my immediate sensations” [44]. Moreover, “ ... many philosophers, including John Stuart Mill, have supposed there to be a problem of other minds, according to which I may reasonably doubt the legitimacy of applying, say, sensation-words to beings other than myself” [44].

Now, we already encounter a problem, in terms of defining exactly what we are talking about, since, in the language of communication theory, “Strictly speaking, nothing is inherently a symbol, a referent, or an inference. They do not exist outside of the ‘mind’ however much we refer to them as ‘things,’ ‘words,’ etc. Anything can SERVE as a focus for those acts of mind which we call ‘symbolizing,’ ‘referring,’ and ‘inferring.’ When something is not so serving because no mind is present, it cannot validly be called a ‘symbol,’ a ‘referent,’ or an ‘inference.’ Furthermore, in the presence of different minds, what is a symbol to one often is a referent to another, and an inference to a third” [47]. In order to get around these objections we could theoretically postulate a “logically perfect language” [48], and in this system “... there will be one word and no more for every simple object, and everything that is not simple will be expressed by a combination of words, by a combination derived, of course, from the words for the simple things that enter in, one word for each simple component” [48]. We note that a language of this sort “ ... will be completely analytic, and will show at a glance the logical structure of the facts asserted or denied” [48]. However, there are complications, in that “A logically perfect language, if it could be constructed, would not only be intolerably prolix, but, as regards its vocabulary, would be very largely private to one speaker. That is to say, all the names that it would use would be private to that speaker and could not enter into the language of another speaker” [48]. The reason for this arises from the fact that, as we have seen, “Strictly speaking, nothing is inherently a symbol, a referent, or an inference” and so “A name, in the narrow logical sense of a word whose meaning is a particular, can only be applied to a particular with which the speaker is acquainted, because you cannot name anything you are not acquainted with” [48]. So, to give a concrete example of such usage, “One can use ‘this’ as a name to stand for a particular with which one is acquainted at the moment. We say ‘This is white’ ... But if you try to apprehend the proposition that I am expressing when I say ‘This is white’, you cannot do it. If you mean this piece of chalk as a physical object, then you are not using a proper name. It is only when you use ‘this’ quite strictly, to stand for an actual object of sense [i.e., a sense-datum], that it is really a proper name. And in that it has a very odd property for a proper name, namely that it seldom means the same thing two moments running and does not mean the same thing to the speaker and to the hearer ...” [48]. The crux of the matter is summed up by stating that “In order to understand a name for a particular, the only thing necessary is to be acquainted with that

particular. When you are acquainted with that particular, you have a full, adequate and complete understanding of the name, and no further information is required” [48]. There does exist a counter to Russell’s postulation of a “logically perfect language,” in that the reasons for saying that such a language “ ... would be private are so idiosyncratic that they are perhaps peculiar to him. To accept these grounds would be to accept both Russell’s logical atomism *and* his particular brand of solipsistic empiricism. The atomism is required to motivate the hunt for things that are ‘simple’ in the sense that they are not and cannot be constructed out of anything smaller, and the solipsistic empiricism is required to defend the view that those ‘simples’ could only be private sense-data. One further needs to adopt a referential theory of meaning, because only then would one insist that the meanings of the words in one’s language had to be the *things* to which the words of language refer” [8]. In fact we could go so far as to say that these arguments “ ... would seem to show that what Russell purports to be merely ‘intolerably prolix’ and ‘very inconvenient’ is, in fact, incoherent. There can be no such thing as the private language imagined by Russell, because the only criteria for the correct or incorrect uses of the words of this language would be private criteria. And ... private criteria are no criteria at all” [8].

Let us now dissect the conclusion that “There can be no such thing as private language because the only criteria for the correct or incorrect uses of the words of this language would be private criteria. And private criteria are no criteria at all.” We begin by asking in general, what are the conditions for using any language to communicate ideas? The answer is that “For there to be factual assertion, there must be the distinction between truth and falsehood, between saying what is the case and saying what is not” [44]. However, there is an important practical corollary to this last statement, since we realize that “For there to be the distinction between truth and falsehood, there must be a further distinction between the source of the meaning, and the source of the truth, of what is said” [44]. The problem that then arises is that, “...If you can’t describe a procedure for distinguishing two alternatives, then there *aren’t* two alternatives. If I can’t describe how I can tell if I am correctly remembering an association – a rule – rather than incorrectly, then the claim ‘I remembered correctly’ [taking Wittgenstein’s Private Language example] is not potentially true or false, it is meaningless” [39]. And so we go on to consider how one might put forward such a “decision protocol” for our communication. In order to proceed we need some technical definitions for the “rules of communication”, as extracted from the above discussion, and we can “ ... usefully begin our catalog of definitions with another distinction” [49]. This is the distinction between *ostensive* definition and *verbal* definition. We say that “An *ostensive* definition is one where the definer points to or refers the audience to an example or a sample of what is to be specified. To point to a fire truck and say that is the color red is an ostensive definition of that color. Clauses like ‘X means that’ where the ‘that is accompanied by a gesture or action or example is an Ostensive definition” [49]. The nature of ostensive definition requires that it have four implicit criteria: scene-setting, gesture, sample and projection [44] and it is exemplified by “Defining a term by pointing to an exemplary or paradigmatic referent” [50]; for example, “I say to my

Spanish friend, 'What is a *'lápiz'*?'; he points to a pencil and says, 'This is a *'lápiz'*.' That would be an ostensive definition of *'lápiz'*" [50]. By contrast, "A *verbal* definition ... is one which is spelt out using different words which are clearer and more familiar than the definiendum [thing to be defined], and which avoids paronymous forms of the definiendum [those derived from the same root], and is, whenever possible, stated positively" [49].

OK, let's plough on with an illustration of these definitions in use and "Suppose that I confront some object and say of it 'This is S'. If I must also appeal to this very object to make this utterance intelligible to myself, I deprive it of any claim to the status of factual assertion – it becomes, at best, ostensive definition" [44]. Of course this was understood by Wittgenstein who states of the putative "signs" in his theorized Private Language " ... first of all that a definition of the sign cannot be ... [expressed]" [43] – this was expanded on by Candlish who explains that " ... the point follows by definition from the fact that the case is one where the definition is private ... So if meaning is to be obtained for the 'sign', this must be achieved through a private exercise of ostensive definition, where I concentrate on the sensation and produce the sign at the same time. (In these circumstances, meaning cannot be extracted from a pre-existing practice of private use, since what is in question is how such a use could be established in the first place.)" [44]. We return to exactly the problem discussed above, the realisation that "Sharability is necessary for the assignment of meaning. Without a way of checking a rule, there is no rule. There is then no distinction between correct and incorrect claims; no contentful private claims; no truth for the propositions in the 'language'" [39]. We can summarise the problems raised by these arguments by stating that " ... if this exercise is to be genuine and successful ostensive definition, it must *establish* the connection between sign and sensation, and this connection must *persist*. As Wittgenstein says, "I impress [the connection] on myself" can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connection *right* in the future'. For I do not define anything, even to myself let alone anyone else, by merely attending to something and making a mark, unless this episode has the appropriate consequences" [44].

Of course this argument is really very subtle, for, in the previous statement, we must bear in mind that "'Right' is not going to be the same as 'seems right to me'; but the latter, which has no evidential force, is the most I can expect to achieve in private" [39]. In other words, "Before I can be said to have established a meaning for 'S', I must have set up, in advance, as part of my private system, some *independent* way of – some independent rule for – establishing the correctness of such later claims as 'This sensation is an S'" [39]. And now we arrive at the heart of the Private Language Argument as perceived by Candlish: "A private language needs private ostensive definition of its symbols. But this is self-contradictory, because the four criteria implicit in public ostensive definition [scene-setting, gesture, sample and projection] ... cannot be satisfied privately – not even if they are converted to abstracted *analogous* criteria" [44]. Here we stress the importance of Candlish's observation that in his view the self-contradiction remains "even if the public criteria are converted to abstracted *analogous*

criteria.” And there is one problem of particular import, that “ ... the *fourth criterion* cannot be satisfied: Since sensations are inaccessible to others, there is no independent criterion for correctness of ascription of ‘S’ to a sensation; there is no method of projection, no method of checking, no normative practice, no rule” [44]. Thonemann argues somewhat differently about the relevance of the public criteria to the Private Language, stating that “Since only the first three criteria [scene-setting, gesture, sample] can be satisfied, the sensation used as a sample merely *remains* the sample, available for repeated partial ostensive definition” [39]; and that thus “No contentful true statement can be made, using ‘S’, about the sensation. For example, ‘That sensation is S’ will always be tautological, equivalent to ‘That sensation is that sensation’” [39]. On the basis of either of these interpretations, therefore, it would appear that we are left high-and-dry in terms of the possibility of a putative Private Language, and thus we see that , “ ... Wittgenstein concluded that such a private language is impossible because the originator would be unable to establish meanings for its signs; you can’t name anything you aren’t acquainted with. For example, even the sensation of itching derives its identity from a shared use of language” [45].

Moreover, there is another upshot to Candlish’s interpretation of the negative conclusions of the *Philosophical Investigations* regarding a putative Private Language, if we recognize that “Previous attempts to make sense of intentionality have been blocked by the ‘philosophical temptation’ to think of experience as something we receive pre-conceptually. This is the assumption (often called ‘the myth of the given’ or ‘the dualism of scheme and given’ by those who reject it) that our stream of consciousness is something we have to work up into articulable shape by imposing on experience a conceptual form ... ” [20]. Now “The temptation to suppose ... [this] exercises so strong a grip on philosophical imagination that we require therapy (‘the philosopher’s treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness’ ...), a talking cure of the sort that will isolate the sources of confusion, bring to our attention the pictures and metaphors that have misled us, elicit from us some recognition of the failure to have thought correctly, all in order to acquire from us full co-operation in the necessary re-direction of our thinking” [20]. So, in terms of the Private Language Argument, “ ... if we are ensnared by the myth of the given and so take experience to be non-conceptual, we must be committed to the possibility of a logically private language. So once we recognise the cogency of the PLA, we must renounce the myth. More particularly it is by drawing attention to the incoherence of the myth’s implications for language that the PLA exposes what is wrong with the myth overall” [20]. If we follow this path then we end up concluding along with McDowell that “ ... an already conceptual episode is the *first* thing that happens in the space of reasons; its coming to be the case that some conceptual structure is in place is not the end of some transition within the space of reasons – the transition that a conceptualization of a prior non-conceptual item would supposedly be – but the beginning of everything relevant that happens in that space” [51], and that in short, “The world’s impressions on our senses are already possessed of conceptual content” [52]. McDowell goes on to state that “ ... the Private Language Argument just is the rejection of the Given, in

so far as it bears on the possibilities for language; it is not an application of a general rejection of the Given to a particular area" [52]. Sellars, in his "*Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*" [53] attacks the "myth of the given" in a different way. Let's first introduce Brandom's terms [54] referring to "... that sort of awareness common to non-language using animals as 'sentience' in contrast to that available to language-users, which he calls 'sapience.' This distinction allows for some sort of meaningful engagement in the world on the part of mere sentients while maintaining the ... conviction that language institutes distinctly new modes of meaning" [55]. In this vein, "... Brandom elucidates language's relationship to praxis as follows. Language provides the capacity for speakers to make explicit meanings that are already implicit in their practices. The resulting explications would not have the meaning they do absent those already established implicit meanings, but they take on new roles not available to mere unspoken aspects of practices. Most of all, linguistic explications can play normative roles, particularly as 'tokens' in ... games of giving and asking for reasons – arguments and other practices of logic and reasoning" [55]. Now, with respect to these definitions, Sellars gives "... a critique of the widespread philosophical presupposition that pre-linguistic perception and experience are already meaningful in the way that language-influenced perception and experience are. What is allegedly *given* is conceptually formed awareness of objects and events, or what Brandom terms 'sapience,' as contrasted with the non-conceptual awareness that travels under the heading 'sentience'" [55]. Furthermore, "As Brandom goes on to explain, these characteristics of sapient beings distinguish them from 'merely reliable' responders to their environment such as thermometers as well as merely sentient creatures such as cats who are awake without being 'subject to the peculiar force of the better reason' ... Meaning, for Brandom, is 'constituted' in practices by humans' normative attitudes and 'deontic scorekeeping' concerning each other's performances. Not only does this account not rule out a place for some sense of meaning prior to language, it demands it, as the work of language is principally to *make explicit* those meaning (or proto-meanings) that are implicit in our praxis" [55]. Thus "Sellars contends that only by being initiated into and trained in the language games of giving and asking for reasons, as well as those further language games that presuppose such reasoning, does one enter 'the space of reasons.' In this space one's perceptions, actions, thoughts, and utterances have normative force" [55]. Sellars' conclusion is that "Without the requisite normative training one is actually merely sentient, engaging with the world not necessarily in a merely mechanical way, but yet not in a conceptual way. Conceptual awareness is not given. It must be achieved" [55]. And "Thus language for Sellars is conceptually prior to perception, at least as we human adults perceive, and one can easily extend this line of thinking to contend that language is likewise prior to praxis. In strictly temporal terms some sort of perception and praxis must supercede human language acquisition, but these sorts must, per Sellars, be impoverished in concepts, and hence in meaning, relative to that experienced by language-users" [55].

At this point, let us take a moment to recapitulate. The so-called Private Language Argument starts from the idea that: "If a language were to be private, there would be no independent

checking of putative associations between its signifier (symbol) and the signified (thing) – no first-person criterion of correctness” [39]. It then “ ... proceeds to argue to the conclusion that ‘private language’ is inconsistent. It purports to show the disastrous consequences of lack of checkability – to show that a private language, to *be* a language, must include a first-person criterion of correctness (though a public language does not need one; in it, the correctness of my propositions is regulated via the informal agreement of a network of users)” [39]. Furthermore, Candlish extends this argument in stating that “... the question of factual infallibility in future uses of the sign ... is not the issue ... we see that ‘I remember the connection *right*’ refers to remembering a *meaning*, namely, the meaning of the sign” [44]. With this distinction regarding “meaning” firmly in mind, we can reformulate and relax the conclusion somewhat in stating that “The private linguist cannot legislate a meaning for a sign by ‘private ostensive definition’ *merely* – for this has to establish a technique of using the sign ... The technique cannot function by means of repeated ‘ostensive definitions’ ... since this collapses the distinction between meaning and truth and thus destroys the possibility of making factual judgments. So the so-called ‘definition’ has on some other basis to establish a constancy in use of the sign” [44]. However, even for Adam alone in the Garden, thinking about his own thoughts and talking to himself about language, there is hope, and, following Thonemann, we shall now go in search of a counter to Candlish’s conclusions, that is we seek a positive “basis to establish a constancy in the use of the sign” in this Private Language sense.

In order to do this, let us now follow a different tack and compare the merits of three types of symbolic system which we can label S1, S2 and S3, through the consideration of which we aim to establish effective, unambiguous, Private Language communication. These are defined, following Thonemann [39] as follows: S1 is “A symbolic system ... in which there is no attempted *association* of signifier with signified, [which] is contradictory, because it is not a ‘system’”; S2 is “A system ... in which there *is* an uncheckable attempted constant association, [which] is not contradictory; and S3 is “our public language” [39]. We see that “A private system is of this type [S2]. It can operate. It does what it does – not much” [39]. In terms of the Private Language Argument, Thonemann emphasizes that “*This is our main result*” [39]. He goes on to say that “We argue that type S2, of which a private language is an example, *is* coherent (as is type S3, our public language)” [39]. These arguments lead to the following statement: “OK, a private language [of type S2] can’t be checked” [thonemann], and that “... A Robinson Crusoe system, which cannot *in practice* be checked, though *in principle* it could be (if anyone else arrives), is of this type” [39]. The thundering philosophical “I AM” of the Private Language Argument is in this case is reduced to a whimpering “So what?” [thonemann], and we attempt to show the true importance of this philosophical reduction in what follows. One important lesson to be learned from the laborious logic laid out for language in the arguments above is that “Judgements of value are unwisely intermingled with those of coherence in some texts” [39], and we note that “... [We have not discussed] yet whether S2 has any *value*. Only its *coherence* is in dispute ...” [39]. So, putting aside

questions of “value” for the time being, and concentrating on “coherence,” we have got to the point where we can ask “... In system S2, how is meaning ... made? How does the associating occur? What can an isolated person *do*, once he has had a sensation?” [39]. And despite the fact that Candlish insists that “A private language needs private ostensive definition of its symbols. But this is self-contradictory, because the four criteria implicit in public ostensive definition [scene-setting, gesture, sample and projection] ... cannot be satisfied privately – not even if they are converted to abstracted *analogous* criteria” [44], Thonemann invokes exactly what Candlish denies, that is private categories analogous to stage-setting, gesturing, sampling and projecting. So, for Thonemann’s isolated Adam – “(i) He can decide that he will make the symbol for this sensation a noun, or an adjective, in a symbolic system (‘Stage-setting’, which is much *easier* in private than in public). (ii) He can attend to the sensation (analogous to an ‘ostensive gesture’, and, again, much *easier* in private than in public (‘Why is that man waving his arms about?’) ([And conversely we note that] ... for instance ... in the public case of ‘lemony smell’ there is no gesture) (iii) and (iv): He can use his memory to decide whether a later sensation is the same as the original one (analogous to locating a ‘sample’ – a standard of correctness; and furthermore analogous to the ‘method of projection’ – laying the new entity beside the standard for comparison)” [39]. The crucial positive feature of these actions is that “These abstracted, analogous, private versions of the criteria for public ostensive definition, are sufficient to make meaning – to achieve an attempted association of the symbol with the sensation; indeed, they are more likely to do so than analogous use of the four public criteria in S3” [39]. And of course this is in diametrical opposition to Candlish’s previous conclusions.

So far, so good: and now for the rub, when we ask conversely “In system S2, what can an isolated person *not* do – assuming that his memory is faultless?” [39]. The answer this time is that “He cannot offer an independent court of appeal to judge whether the association is being employed correctly. He has no way of checking whether he is correctly identifying a sensation as an ‘S’; there is no operational distinction between him *thinking* that the sensation is an ‘S’, and the sensation actually *being* an ‘S’” [39]. So, after all that work we can state with confidence that “... Our fundamental result is this: S2 (a private language) is coherent – conceptually consistent” [39]. Now, a Private Language Argument opponent “... could respond that the reason why he objects to S2 isn’t just linguistic – that S2 isn’t the kind of thing we usually call a ‘language’. This, he says, is an uncharitable interpretation of his argument” [39]. The thrust of the objection is that “... a usual word such as ‘language’ refers to a concept of some importance – of some value. The linguistic usage has arisen because S3’s cluster of features has usually been valued, and therefore named ‘a language’. S2’s hasn’t. S2 is valueless, pointless” [39]. We do note at this point, however, that “This is now a judgement of value, rather than a judgement of contradictoriness. The previous claim was that a private, uncheckable, symbolic system S2 is incoherent. The new claim is that it is coherent, but valueless” [39]. There are philosophical counters to this statement, however, since “S2 is valueless, in everyday terms. But it has value to philosophers ... It has value – possibly – to

an empiricist philosopher who is developing a theory concerning the structure of human knowledge. She may want to be able to *refer* to the private sensations. She may (arguably) want to be able to imagine an isolated Cartesian soul, presented with sensations, and conjecturing the existence of the external world, and then other minds, on the basis of these sensations” [39].

Let us summarize Thonemann’s results up to this point regarding a putative Private Language: “... A system of type S3, in which there is *checkable* constant association, is not contradictory ... A public system (usually called our ‘language’) is of this type ... The independent checking makes S3 *more* valuable than S2. It is used for interpersonal communication, and for assisting memory” [39]. And then let’s ask: is S2 a “language” in the same sense as S3? However this semantic skulduggery can be dismissed by noticing that “This is a merely linguistic question; it translates as: ‘Is S2 the kind of system which, in everyday usage, would be called a “language?”’” [39]. And Thonemann gives an appropriate, blunt, response, in stating: “‘Who cares what it would be *called*?’ The substantial question is not ‘How shall we classify it?’, but ‘What properties does it have?’ ... Only a person chasing the shadow of linguistic essence persists in asking: ‘No, but is it *really* a language?’, feeling that this is an important question” [39]. So, at this point we realise that there are “... two apparently conflicting exegetical claims: 1. Language is essentially social. 2. It is conceptually (even if not psychologically) possible that a lifelong Crusoe (i.e., a human being isolated from birth) should employ some kind of linguistic system and follow rules in so doing” [44]. Given all the philosophizing above, it is not hard, though, to construct a sensible counterargument to such a conflict along the lines that “... admission of the first claim does not ... [necessitate] the denial of the second. To take the first notion ... while chess is essentially a game for two players, this does not exclude the possibility of playing it against oneself provided such solitary games are not regarded as paradigm instances of chess. Similarly ... [one] can claim that language is essentially social, but still allow the possibility of exceptions provided these are peripheral cases” [44].

We conclude this exegesis on the philosophy of the nature of a potential Private Language and its use in communication by stating what is essentially Kripke’s “Community View” of language, that “If one person is considered in isolation, the notion of a rule as guiding the person who adopts it can have *no* substantive content” [56] – that is, that “Language, it appears, only means anything within a particular context ... Language games imply language communities – at the very least, groups of users who hold a game in common” [57]. We see that “This requirement of community agreement for meaning ... obviously rules out the possibility of private language immediately, thereby rendering the argument of *Philosophical Investigations* ... superfluous” [44]. This generates a philosophical conundrum since “This superfluity makes for an odd reading of the text; and the oddness is highlighted by the observation that this first formulation of the sceptical problem relies on Kripke’s assumption that we have some idea of what a fact is, independent of a statement’s being true” [44]. Now

in fact, “ ... one of the themes of *Philosophical Investigations* is that there is no such idea, that the only route to the identification of facts is through the uses of the expressions in which those facts are stated, uses which give us the truth-conditions. These uses are often very different from what we would expect – hence the impression that truth-conditions are lacking – and it is a matter of some philosophical difficulty to see them clearly” [44]. Further weight is given to the argument in favour of the possibility of a form of Private Language by noting that if we return to “the conclusion that seemed to undermine the individual psychology framework of generative grammar” [58], that is Kripke’s Community View stated above, then “... we see that this must be understood as referring not to an individual whose behaviour is unique but to someone ‘considered in isolation’ in the sense that he is not considered as a person, like us” [58]. At this point we can demolish this conclusion, since “We consider Robinson Crusoe to be a person, like us. He has a private language with its own rules, which we discover and attribute to him by some means” [58]. And with this “ ... the argument against private language is defanged” [58]. We can further state that “It is clear that an argument which has as its focus the question of ostensive definition is not committed to ruling out in advance all hypothetical cases of ‘Robinson Crusoes’” [44]. The reason for this is that “ ... there is no *a priori* barrier to imagining a form of life complex enough for us to be assured that a determinate ostensive definition had been accomplished by such a being. Such a Crusoe, unlike a private linguist, lives in a world independent of his impressions of it, and thus there could be definite occurrences in it which he could remember or forget; and some of those occurrences could be correlations of signs with objects” [44]. However, this argument runs counter to a discussion of a potential Private Language as a “language game” – “one of the forms which human social life – but only human life – may take” [5]. Further reasonable doubt can also be cast on this Community View, since “In [Kripke’s] Wittgenstein’s ‘solution,’ the community turns up as a *phenomenon*. People can be credited with possessing and understanding concepts, notwithstanding the impossibility of our ever identifying the rules governing our use of terms. Men can be credited with comprehension simply by virtue of their incorporation in a community whose members appear to tolerate each other semantically. Such membership in a shared-reaction group is all that ‘comprehension’ can ever mean ... As Groucho Marx might have said, I for one would not wish to join a community that understood people like me. Why anyone should count this as a solution is totally beyond my understanding (though Kripke appears to be impressed). It looks to me much more like a dogmatic refusal to face the problem – like treating a mystery as its own solution” [59]. Moreover, “In another sense Wittgenstein must have had much stricter requirements in mind than those ascribed to him by the Kripke interpretation. For if the necessity of being within a community of rule-followers is all that the PLA insists on, then it would be consistent to imagine someone learning and engaging in rule-following practices, so long as they did so within a social context, even if that context were composed of people who each used a language logically private to them, languages whose terms could not be understood by others because, for example, their reference was determined by private ostensive definition ... and Wittgenstein was evidently quite unprepared to allow this” [20]. This is also related to the

arguments of Hacker [60], who has Wittgenstein steering “... a careful course between Cartesian dualism and behaviourism” [20]. In this case, “... the central claim is that a person could not be following a rule ‘if, despite the person’s living in a community, the putative rule which he purports to be following could not logically be followed by, or even communicated to, anyone else’ ... *A fortiori*, a person could not be following the particular kinds of rule involved in speaking a language, such as those defining the meaning of the terms employed, if the putative rules could not be followed by anyone else – if, for example, the meaning of those terms was determined ostensively by each person individually fixing their attention on a particular ‘inner’ or ‘mental’ experience conceived of as logically private to them, a feeling or process or sensation that no one else could share or know” [20]. As an offshoot from this discussion we realize that “Language games can be ‘played’ selfishly or altruistically” [57], and we are then led to question “What are the effects of emotion within these groups / communities? That is, to look at it one way, what differences are there for behaviour and consciousness between sympathetic and unsympathetic language communities?” [57]. A partial answer to this question is approached by Chomsky who explains that “... if [Boris and] I follow [different] conventions ... it is plainly because Boris and I differ in some respect, in some property of our mind/brains ... [those who] follow ... similar conventions [to me, do so] because our mind/brains are ... similar in the relevant respects and different from Boris’s. I do not deviate from my ‘norms’ or ‘conventions’ if I differ in judgments and other behaviour from ... [them]” [61]. And it would be well for us always to bear the example of Boris and Noam in mind. However there is still a strong caveat on making conceptual arguments comparing different hypothetical groups of language users in this way, and Chomsky makes the point that “In general, all discussions that make use of an unanalyzed notion of community in considering norms, conventions, ‘misuse of language’, etc., must be seriously reconsidered” [61]. He states that “It is doubtful, in my view, that they can be made coherent in any way relevant to the issues at hand. In brief, if the communities introduced in the analyses are homogeneous, the resort to a ‘community’ contributes nothing; if they are not homogeneous in relevant respects, the argument does not go through” [61].

In the aftermath of these diametrically opposed conclusions on the possible existence and utilization of a Private Language for intrapersonal communication, let us return now to Wittgenstein’s philosophico-linguistic therapy and the headaches it might well provoke in trying to reconcile them, and ask “Would our approach be equally mistaken if we were using ‘headache’ quasi-figuratively to describe our engagement with that very problem – the cramps in my mind which hamper my ability and inhibit my desire to get clear about the issues, so like the throbbing at my temples when I have a headache which restricts my ability and desire to see and move? Even then, perhaps. These mental cramps may be caused by my efforts to elucidate the problem of sensation, and I might do well to study my condition to find some way of relieving the ache” [20]. De Gaynesford puts forward two ways of dealing with these problems – “One way of learning about my condition would be to ask when and why it seems right to describe it using the language of bodily pain and of headaches in

particular. Or here is another possibility: I might relieve the ache by attending to its cause, studying the problem of sensation instead of my condition and easing the latter by finding solutions to the former. Both approaches recognise various forms of intimacy between philosophy and therapy without supposing one can get clear about the former by indulging in the latter” [20]. Moreover, in terms of a critique of the Wittgensteinian approach we realize that “If we then start talking about the *certainty* with which we know our own pain, then we need to be shown that what prompts such talk is a confusion between a grammatical remark and a material one. ‘One plays patience by oneself’ is a *grammatical* remark. ‘I went to the cinema and saw the film by myself’ is a *material* remark. The first might be use to explain to somebody what kind of game patience is. Similarly the sentence ‘Sensations are private’ is a grammatical remark; it says what kinds of things sensations are, it does not, e.g., report a possible *discovery* about sensations” [8]. A further factor is that “One of Wittgenstein’s aims in *Philosophical Investigations* is to show the incoherence of ... [the] picture of the relative priority of the private and the public. The thing ... to which *only* I have access *cannot* be the meaning – or even the reference – of words that have a public use. And, as words like ‘belief’, ‘desire’, ‘intention’, ‘thought’, etc. undeniably have a public use, it follows that neither their reference nor their meaning can possibly be something essentially private” [8]. Now we can turn to calls that Wittgenstein’s philosophy is implicitly behaviourist, since “‘An inner process stands in need of outward criteria’ runs one of the most often quoted aphorisms of *Philosophical Investigations*, an aphorism that many have cited in support of the notion that Wittgenstein was some sort of behaviourist, and interpretation that needs to be resisted. One way of resisting it is to realize what an emphasis Wittgenstein placed on the need for sensitive perception of those ‘outward criteria’ in all their imponderability. And where does one find such acute sensitivity? Not, typically, in the works of psychologists, but in those of the great artists, musicians and novelists” [8]. Thus, in summary, “The mistake Wittgenstein himself made in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* ... is the mistake we *all* make when we want to counter behaviourism with some suggestion of the sort that thoughts, desires, etc. are not *nothing*. No, they are not nothing, and they are not identical with behaviour either. But neither are they *things*, and the only reason we want them to be things is that we are committed to a faulty view of language, and that thinks that to every meaningful word there must correspond some *object*. *Philosophical Investigations* – indeed, Wittgenstein’s entire later philosophy – begins and ends with an attack on this misunderstanding about the nature of language” [8]. And this is why “From 1929 until his death in 1951, Wittgenstein worked on a new way of doing philosophy that had no precedent in the history of the subject. It is a way of approaching philosophy that tries to remain faithful to the insight he had in the *Tractatus* that philosophy *cannot* be a science, or anything like a science. It is not a body of doctrine but an activity, the activity of clearing up the confusions caused by the bewitchments cast by language” [8] – in Monk’s view, “This conception of the subject is, in my opinion, Wittgenstein’s most radical and most important contribution to philosophy” [8].

Having navigated the stormy seas and peaceful lakes of Wittgenstein’s logico-philosophico-

linguistic tracts, I am tempted to ask, along with de Gaynesford – “Is this rich variety something we are meant to engage with, so as to appreciate the depth and subtlety of the problems at issue and thus pursue conclusive and satisfying answers to the questions arising, or are we meant precisely to renounce such goals, recognising in full appreciation of the questions being raised that they neither call for nor admit of conclusive solution, that temporary remission from anxieties brought on by pondering such problems is all we can expect, and that this remission itself consists in a willingness to be flexible and accommodating, to renounce dogmatic attempts at identifying the *essence* of what is problematic, *the* paradigm philosophical method, *the* ideal final solution” [20]? And we may well ask of the *Philosophical Investigations* – “What *do* they have to teach us? Well, to name one crucially important thing: the importance of imponderable evidence for the understanding of the people around us” [8]. The problem here is that despite all our “willingness to be flexible and accommodating” we find that “The notion of ‘imponderable evidence’ is somewhat slippery, and there are signs that Wittgenstein himself was, at times at least, somewhat sceptical of it” [8]. To use Wittgenstein’s own example: “... I have seen the look which one person has given another. I say ‘If you had seen it you would have said the same thing.’ Some other time perhaps, I might get him to see this look, and then he will be convinced. That would be *one* possibility” [62]. He goes on to claim that such “imponderable evidence” has properties such that “1. it can be *seen* as evidence for a particular judgment, but usually it cannot be described other than as evidence for that judgment (e.g, ‘How do you *know* your father dislikes your boyfriend?’ ‘I could tell by the way he looked at him’ ‘And how did he look at him?’ ‘Well, ... as if he didn’t like him’) 2. the value of the evidence varies with the experience and the knowledge of the person providing it, and this is more or less the *only* way of weighing such evidence, since 3. it cannot be evaluated, weighed, *pondered*, by appeal to any system of general principles or universal laws” [62]. And Monk points out that “In all these respects it stands in stark contrast to *scientific* evidence” [8], and comments further that “The notion of imponderable evidence serves in Wittgenstein’s final writings as a way of distancing himself from, on the one hand, those who look to science to provide psychological insight, and, on the other, those in the humanities who have become convinced that understanding another person, having access to their inner life, is impossible” [8]. We make the link here between imponderable evidence and intrapersonal communication in the observation by Ellis that “Discovering what someone is like involves, among many other things, attempting to reconstruct what has been called their internal soliloquy” [8] – and “As we have no access to anybody’s ‘internal soliloquy’ but our own, Ellis calls the claim that we can understand another human being as an ‘affable pretence’” [8]. Wittgenstein addresses the problem by asking “Why can’t we be certain that someone is not pretending? – ‘Because one cannot look into him.’ – But if you could, what would you see there? ‘His secret thoughts.’ – But if he only utters them in Chinese – where do you have to look to find out whether he is uttering them truthfully? Even if I were now to hear everything that he is saying to himself, I would know as little what his words were referring to as if I read *one* sentence in the middle of

a story. Even if I knew everything now going on within him, I still wouldn't know, for example, to whom the names and images in his thoughts related" [63]. Monk gives a further, personal, example in explaining that "If somebody asks me how my son looked when he finished the computer game he had been playing all summer I might reply: 'he looked pleased and triumphant.' If somebody asked me how my daughter looked on her first day at school, I would reply: 'She looked nervous and hesitant.' To say of somebody that they are nervous, hesitant, pleased or triumphant is to attribute to them a mental state, and, therefore ... to engage in the 'affable pretence' of having access to another person's 'inner' feelings. But, when we talk like that, we are forgetting that these words are used in a perfectly ordinary way to describe how people *look*, and, therefore, in some sense their 'outer appearance'" [8]. And we are back to the Private Language Argument once again – but, with the realization that if this "affable pretence" is communicatively effective, then we should not, perhaps, be overly bothered about the "true content" of the "internal soliloquy."

Let us now go on to investigate the concept of internal dialogue from the perspective of communication theory, and following Shedelsky, we come up with the view that "If we hold that the act of communication is active, constructive of reality (as opposed to receptive of reality), then it would follow that we locate intrapersonal communication at least at the level of perception within the cognitive domain. Similarly, if we characterize intrapersonal communication as symbolic behaviour, as involving encoding and/or decoding, then we locate intrapersonal communication at least at the level of perception. That is, if we define intrapersonal communication in terms of the cognitive operations involved, then, at the very least, it is an act involving conceptual thought" [64]. We have intimated previously the allure of intrapersonal communication processes to philosophers from Plato to James, and we now see that "In Jamesian terms, to communicate is to come to know about. It follows from this formulation that we do not tell each other about our direct experiences (which we know of) instead, we tell one another about what we know about, and, more generally, we communicate about what we know about as we make meaning" [64]. In the light of this statement, and following from the debates on the possibility of Private Language and their exposition in terms of philosophical therapy, we can now present a strong theoretic critique, after Cunningham, as to the definition and very nature of the phenomenon of "Interpersonal Communication" (IaC) [65]. Cunningham states that "Recently, questions have been raised ... about difficulties just in trying to define IaC. For the most part, however, it remains an uncontested model. Its theorists assume that IaC, either as a reality or as a powerful model, comprises a range of functions, and that it augments our understanding of both what communication is and what it means to be a human being" [66]. He contends that "Those who do not know their history of philosophy are condemned to repeat it. Do IaC theorists realize that they repeat virtually the same kinds of risky moves that have been diagnosed and criticized so compellingly by such frontline thinkers as Ryle and Wittgenstein?" [66], and seeks to answer the question "If IaC's epistemic scope is virtually indistinguishable from that of 'mind' or 'soul', what scientific or dialectical advance has been made by replacing these

older conceptions with the newer construct? If IaC is neither less occult nor more explanatory than these older concepts, why retain it all? Is *intrapersonal communication* anything more than a neologism?" [66].

In terms of definition, "Many IaC theorists refer to the work of psychologists and neurophysiologists to reinforce their point that IaC comprises a number of intrapersonal processes" [66]. We find that "Collectively, the literature makes a surprising number of claims about IaC. Many of these claims identify functions, events or operations such as inner dialogue, reasoning or the processing of information. Other claims have more to do with the characteristics or properties of IaC. For example, some believe that IaC is the foundation of all communication, and that it is an important source of self-knowledge. Accordingly, as a first step in understanding what IaC is supposed to be, it is important to provide a catalog of these operations and characteristics" [66]. These can be summarized in the following way, where detailed references to the scientific literature given in [66] have been suppressed: "IaC is exclusively a neurophysiological activity ... IaC is virtually a continuous process in our waking state ... From the earliest days of this theory, the relationship of IaC to language and symbols has been problematic ... IaC is essential both to the reality of, and to our understanding of, all communication ... IaC, or knowledge of IaC adds to our knowledge of ourselves and to our understanding of the process of communicating with others ... It is a source of personal development and self-discovery, of self-understanding, of our view of ourselves – both as a part of and apart from our environment ... IaC has therapeutic value. By developing this level of communication, we can promote inner harmony, the union of body and soul, we can regain health and stability, and improve physical functioning ... IaC has a valid role in empirical research" [66]. Now here Cunningham spies a trap, for "At first glance, that kind of referencing seems to lend scientific credence to IaC, but some weighty assumptions have been made. In most cases the scientific authorities alluded to are usually not talking about a form of communication, but, more conservatively, about inner processing in general: cognitive, perceptual and motivational episodes. To call these psychophysiological processes 'communication' is to exercise a transformation that exceeds the interests and insights of the allegedly supporting authorities" [66]. In fact, Cunningham goes as far as to comment on the ambiguity of the label "intrapersonal communication," given that "It is one thing to say that communication behavior is rooted in intrapersonal events or processes, or that it has an important psycho-physiological dimension. It is quite another to leap to the conclusion that these events or processes are themselves 'communication'" [66]. He makes the point that "There is a profound ambiguity at the core of the phrase 'intrapersonal communication processes.' Depending upon how we bracket its phrase constituents, it is possible to come up with two different interpretations" [66]. The first bracketing is as "{Intrapersonal} {communication processes}" – and this is " ... the weaker reading which may simply denote the inner behavioral aspects or foundations of communication in general without positing any distinctive communication type. This interpretation is not controversial since no one would seriously question the reality of the inner physico-psychological basis of communicative

behavior” [66]. We can contrast this with the bracketing as {Intrapersonal communication} {processes} – this “ ... is a much stronger reading: linguistically and semantically, it says that distinctive micro-messages or communication units circulate within each of us. This latter interpretation is the majority view among laC theorists ... “ [66]. If we adopt this stronger reading we can still admit that “ ... the concept of communication is admittedly polymorphous, but both in theoretical discussion ... as well as in everyday discourse it characteristically entails a core of three features: (1) a community of at least two persons (2) a message, construed as something meaningful or informative (3) a sharing, transfer, or exchange of that message ... To this invariant nucleus of defining features may be added several others that tolerate some degree of variety and intermittence: (4) a system of symbols (e.g., natural language) whereby the message is structured (5) a degree of consciousness or awareness (6) an element of purpose or intent, and/or an element of choice either of which serves to distinguish communication as a human activity from mere mechanical impact or physical transfer” [66]. We posit that these are “ ... theoretical requirements which spell out *minimal conditions* for communicative performance and theory building. They are necessary conditions either mentioned, embedded, or implied in any theoretical discussion of communication ranging from mass communication ... and interpersonal communication ... [to intrapersonal communication]“ [66]. Now, on this basis there is a problem since, “If only initially, the theory of laC seems to be counterintuitive, and it violates customary usage” [66]. The reason for this is that “In both ordinary language and communication theory, the term *communication* typically denotes the exchange or sharing of messages between and among persons (including corporate entities), something situated within a community. That is, communication is typically regarded as a molar social phenomenon. In contrast to this normal acceptance, laC posits a message transfer within the individual. This means that the laC model is in sharp conflict with paradigm models of communication” [66]. Moreover, in terms of the features of communication enumerated above “ ... the various claims made about laC are seriously compromised by the fact that these core features are not clearly instantiated; and when they are invoked, they figure only in a highly metaphorical and tenuous fashion” [66]. Cunningham then goes on to demonstrate “the tenuousness of these moves” by “attending more closely to laC’s reliance upon (a) the language of personhood, (b) its appeal to the concept of message, and (c) its inherent dependency upon the notion of private language” [66], all of which are “ ... facets of much more comprehensive defects in the model – namely, its non-specificity and general aura of indeterminacy ... [whereby] by virtue of its very comprehensiveness it becomes indistinguishable from a tautology. What psychological processing within the human agent is *not* laC?” [66].

He deals with (a) the “person or persons unknown” point, by noting that “ ... the person within whom laC is said to take place is not a community, but a single self ... The duality, so necessary for communication, seems to be nothing more than grammatical” [66]. So, for example, Shedelsky puts forward a view of intrapersonal communication which “ ... places emphasis on the interpreter (the receiver). No interactant is required. Nothing is implied about

the intentions of the sender or the source of stimuli, the type of stimuli, the relationship between the stimuli and the idea, or the level of consciousness of either the sender or receiver. According to this view, if you think something like, 'I have to get the laundry done,' you have experienced (intrapersonal) communication. Or, when you think that a scene is beautiful, you have experienced (intrapersonal) communication" [64]. Thus, for Shedelsky, "Whether or not what is decoded originates inside or outside the body of the intrapersonal communicator, and whether or not what is encoded is actually expressed, leaked, or given off, intrapersonal communication has occurred" [67]. Cunningham explains that in order to overcome this objection "Some descriptions go further when they posit dyads within the individual ... laC between the 'I' (that part of our self which is radically 'idiosyncratic and personal') and the 'Me' (that 'part of ourselves that is social product') .. [others] define it as an exchange between 'different structures or levels', namely the conscious and the unconscious" [66]. However, "The strategy of analyzing laC into inner dyads is also methodologically questionable ... [and] amounts to explaining the obscure through the equally obscure ... these hypothetical parts remains just as uncertain as their ontological status" [66]. On this point Cunningham concludes that although "laC is commonly pictured as a 'dialogue' or 'exchange of meaning' between inner psychic structures, but just what are we to make of that subcutaneous exchange? ... Few would disagree that consciousness is a normal condition of communication, but to equate awareness of the self with laC seems unwarranted" [66]. In terms of his attack on (b) the "message as cipher," Cunningham notes that "The term *message* is frequently used in the literature, but just as often other synonyms are used, such as *dialogue*, *inner speech*, *meaning*, *information*" [66]. The whilst the very use of these words imputes " ... a highly semantic and epistemic nature to the message process, its symbolic status remains indefinite. Descriptions such as 'inner speech' and 'talking to oneself' suggest that laC is a fully language-mediated experience cast primarily in propositional form" [66]. So, for example, Shedelsky argues that " ... meaning-making, either encoding or decoding or both, is a defining feature of communication, then we must consider that communication may occur whenever an individual makes meaning. It is just that I would call intrapersonal communication meaning-making ... Intrapersonal communication concerns the processes of assigning meaning (e.g., the mental structures and the retrieval processes of memory) and the products of assigned meaning (e.g., schemata, labels, and memories or more generally, representations)" [64]. Cunningham counters this by saying that "Phrases such as 'encoding-decoding process' and 'symbolic abstractions' indicate that some form of symbolism is at work, though not necessarily a linguistic one" [66]. However Cunningham also presents arguments from authors who claim it is possible that language "may not be a requirement for intrapersonal communication" [68] and goes on to state that " ... it is even less clear whether the message is to be construed as symbolically structured, or as something mutely infrasympolic" [66]. He feels this ironic in that " ... language itself plays a central and constitutive role in the formation of meaning. laC threatens to become unintelligible in direct proportion to the distance placed between it and the structure of symbols and language" [66]. Problems in this area are compounded when " ... we try to relate the alleged message

element to some of the purely affective processes attributed to IaC: feelings, emotional states, and dispositions such as unwillingness. These processes are clearly experiential, but many would hesitate to ascribe symbolized message structures to these affective states” [66]. Cunningham’s final attack on the “strong” reading of {Intrapersonal communication} {processes} is one on (c) “IaC as a Radically Private Language” whereby “*By definition, the message is unavailable for public examination.* ‘Message’ in its normal, nonmetaphorical sense, means a symbolically structured text that, in principle at least, is accessible to more than one person. But the message of IaC is so private and indeterminate that not only agreement but even *disagreement* about its symbolic or nonsymbolic status is ruled out of order” [66]. By invoking Wittgenstein he goes on to show that “This purely hypothetical ‘language’ would be completely self-generated, that is totally unrelated to both external behavior and conventional language systems. It would be a *radically* private language. Inner recordings would be made without any reliance upon a derived system of rules grounded in such public benchmarks as overt speech behavior and the given conventions of natural language” [66]. Following on from this “... there would be no ‘grammar’ in the ordinary sense of that term since, *pace* Chomsky, grammar is a socially evolved rule system involving public agreement ... [thus] these hidden notations would lack fixity or meaning ... there would be nothing to guarantee consistency and regularity in predication” [66]. Cunningham concludes that “Condemned to a solipsistic game of inventing and manipulating signs without the controls and safeguards of publicly anchored language rules, the boundary between illusion and reality disappears ... [becoming, if anything] an empty ritual ... Indeed ... the very practice itself of privately recording our inner sensations is necessarily derivative because naming is itself a universal and integral part of all natural languages, something we learned to do as we learned our mother tongue” [66]. Here we must however remember that we have previously been at pains to demonstrate that such a “language game” might well have value to “... an empiricist philosopher who is developing a theory concerning the structure of human knowledge. She may want to be able to *refer* to the private sensations. She may (arguably) want to be able to imagine an isolated Cartesian soul, presented with sensations, and conjecturing the existence of the external world, and then other minds, on the basis of these sensations” [39]. It may well be that such philosophy be considered “an empty ritual – “a solipsistic game of inventing and manipulating signs without controls” – “erasing the boundary between illusion and reality” – but this then becomes a comment on certain philosophical activities and not on the possibility of intrapersonal communication as such. Cunningham goes on to “nail the coffin closed” by pointing out that “Those accounts of IaC that posit or imply a privately generated symbolism, or that make IaC itself an originating condition or defining element for other levels of communication, veer into the same kind of tenuousness diagnosed by Wittgenstein” [66]. He also dismisses in this context the idea that if all we are discussing is “... simply truncated conversation, a derivative practice that does not take place unless one already knows a publicly shared language (or elements thereof, in the case of children.) ... [then] there is indeed a type of nondirected, noncommunicative thinking and verbalizing – which we call *monologue* or *soliloquy* – that does nothing more than *imitate*

some features of dialogue. To call it *intrapersonal communication*, however, is to make it into something much more than it has to be” [66].

If we return now to the implied tautology inherent in Intrapersonal communication, Cunningham claims that “No one would deny that any number of cognitive processes are somehow involved in communication behavior, but the descriptions of IaC for the most part unguardedly set up an identity between the *definiendum* and one or more of these operations” [66]. He makes the further point that “Indeed, given its epistemic scope, there seems to be little difference between IaC and the philosophical concept of mind or, more comprehensively, the Greco-medieval concept of soul and its system of interactive sensory and intellectual powers ... IaC as the inner dynamo of all information and message processing turns out to be neither less occult nor more explanatory than these older epistemologies or philosophical psychologies. By the same token, one is left to wonder what scientific or dialectical advance has been made by substituting the IaC construct for that of mind or soul” [66]. Cunningham also diagnoses “an embarrassing circularity” in the definition of Intrapersonal communication, to wit “The logical impropriety of IaC is evident in repeated claims that it is the basis and foundation of all other forms of communication. It is also said that *all* communication is to some extent IaC. Consistent with these claims are the added claims that IaC contributes significantly to our understanding of all forms of communication as well as to our own self-knowledge ... [and yet] theorists insist that IaC is the basis of these other forms of communication from which it has just borrowed its principal concepts and vocabulary” [66]. He analyzes the essence of these claims as the statement (including authorial insertions in square brackets) that – “in order to communicate [with others], we must [first] [simultaneously] communicate with[in] ourselves” [66] and then demolishes this by noting that “Since the propositional core simply iterates ‘communication’ it is hard to see how this two-step communication flow is any more informative than a one-step mode” [66]. Moreover, to “ ... assume that the communicator’s agency must be further analyzed into yet another and somehow different level of cause (i.e., IaC) and effect (i.e., public communication behavior.)” [66] “ ... is akin to insisting, quite fallaciously, that a chain of generative causes must terminate in the that which is a cause of itself (*causa sui*)” [66]. Cunningham finally sites the conceptual problem at the heart of the Intrapersonal communication problem in a Rylean “category error” whereby one “represents the facts of mental life as if they belonged to one logical type or category (or range of types or categories) when they actually belong to another” [69]. Thus for the theorist concerned with a “multi-level ... humanistic ... metabolizing ... taking-into-account” approach to communication then “IaC theory makes its crucial move at the point where observable communication activities are seen to involve or entail a host of cognitive functions. But the IaC theorist appears to go one step further when he or she uncritically collapses that interaction and dependency into a strict identity” [66]. Furthermore the theorist then indulges in “ ... a kind of legerdemain which consists in taking a set of metaphors and words which are very much at home in some regions of language ... and using those same expressions to interpret and describe operations in another and very

different area – the intransitive activities of the inner human self” [66]. An example of this is the statement by Kreps and Kunimoto that “Interpersonal communication builds on intrapersonal interaction. Group communications builds on both intrapersonal and interpersonal interactions. Organizational communication builds on the previous three, intrapersonal, interpersonal and group interaction. Societal communication, the largest level of communication ... builds on intrapersonal, interpersonal, group and organizational interactions” [70]. Cunningham believes that at the heart of such sleight-of-mind lies the “Ghost-in-the-Machine” reasoning attacked by “Ryle [who] argued that the Cartesian concept of mind commits this kind of mistake when it makes the inference that behind a person’s thoughtful, feeling and purposive behavior there must be a hidden immaterial substance within which a host of affective and epistemic functions take place” [66]. He points out that the result of this error in communication theory as the spawning of “ ... a double-image or doppelganger form of communication that, in the ensuing confusion, somehow is and is not like the other forms of communication” [66]. The binary oppositions of communication theory (sender-receiver, stimulus-response and so on) also share some blame in this miscegenation since “The basic unit of transfer or exchange between these dyads is some sort of physical impulse or signal. All too quickly, however, those same physical impulses and imprints are promoted to the status of *messages* – even before any provision has been made for the contributions of semantic and symbolic structuring, language, formation rules, and so forth ... it is a short step to conclude further that there must be an inner world of communication, since all sorts of transferences – ‘messages’ – are whizzing around inside our skulls” [66].

If we site Cunningham’s critique of intrapersonal communication theory within the context of modern therapeutic practice and creative change, I suggest that we might end up with a positive reading of Cunningham’s problems with the idea of an “inner world of communication” wherein “all sorts of transferences whiz around inside our skulls” as put forward by the communication theorists. This is based on the fact that all normally-functioning human beings certainly *feel* and *communicate* that they experience such an “inner world of communication,” and that it has a determining influence on their existence, whereby “The world is as it is only because we tell ourselves that it is so as we talk with ourselves and maintain our worldview with our own internal talk” [71]. And indeed we can probably go as far to concede that “consciousness is a normal condition of communication, but to equate awareness of the self with intrapersonal communication seems unwarranted.” And so however we choose to bracket “{Intrapersonal communication processes}” we end up with a need to overcome the “illusions or manifestations of an unbalanced mind” engendered in us by our simulacral modern existences. In terms of psychic transformation and growth, it may well be that “ ... since no one would seriously question the reality of the inner physico-psychological basis of communicative behavior” [66] then all we need are mechanisms to deal with “ ... the inner behavioral aspects or foundations of communication in general without positing any distinctive communication type” [66], even if we end up talking merely in terms of “ ... a type of nondirected, noncommunicative thinking and verbalizing – which we call *monologue* or

soliloquy – that does nothing more than *imitate* some features of dialogue” [66]. We do recognize that “It was the primary mistake of the philosophers from classical days to this day to equate the self as subject with mind; and the self as object with either body or the body-soul unity, or with some other aspect of the self as creature. The fact is that there are not two distinct selves in this internal dialogue. There are merely two foci of the same self. We do, of course, know of a pathological condition in which the self becomes separated into two warring and comparatively discrete entities. This is known as ‘schizophrenia.’ There are pathological states; which border on this internal division. But the healthy self is always one self, no matter how much it engages in a perpetual internal dialogue” [13]. We recognize, then, that what we must address is the fact that, whatever we are doing *in theory*, whatever “messages are whizzing round” – what is important *in practice* is the fact that we often feel that “We do not necessarily know inherently how to communicate with our inner selves. If we were born with that capability – and most likely we were – most of us have long forgotten how. We communicate almost entirely in the language of the aural and visual world. By the time we are able to read these words, we need to train ourselves in listening again to that ‘still, small voice’ inside. And we have learned again to trust that what we hear is no illusion or manifestation of an unbalanced mind. We also must train ourselves to be more *positive* ... Being positive is important because *a positive approach to listening inside and seeking our own Wisdom attracts that which is higher and more positive within us*” [72]. Wittgenstein attempted to provide such a positive approach with his mystico-philosophical-linguistic investigations. One response to this was summarized by Russell when writing to Ottoline Morrell, when he said “He has penetrated deep into mystical ways of thought and feeling, but I think (though he wouldn’t agree) that what he likes best in mysticism is its power to make him stop thinking” [8]. We can contrast this with Monk’s positive view that “The ‘grammatical fictions’ he had exposed in the first half of the *Investigations* are shown to be of the utmost importance because they get in the way, not just of philosophical clarity, but of a full understanding of art, music, literature and, above all, ourselves” [8]. Wittgenstein’s therapeutic approach to “understanding art, music, literature and, above all, ourselves” is rooted in his realization that “Philosophical problems are dissolved by presenting in surveyable form the grammar associated with the questions arising. It is often *by* going through various exercises associated with therapy – e.g. learning about our mental cramps, about what language it seems appropriate to use in describing our difficulties, etc. – that we are able to identify this grammar and work it into surveyable form” [20]. In the process of doing so Wittgenstein “... repudiates even the *tendency* to formulate theories and explanations, renounces any approach that tends towards dogmatism, and exposes generalizations as redundant ... Instead, Wittgenstein advocated methods which replace traditional theorizing with descriptions of the actual use of language, with demonstrations of method by means of examples, with analogies and metaphors that do more successfully the work usually given to explanations” [20], [73]. When we apply these methods we find that “Sometimes the resolution of philosophical problems comes to one in the form of a relief; this can be sudden, unitary and lasting (e.g. when the cause of the condition was a simple error)

or gradual, disconnected and temporary (e.g. when error or confusion is abetted by a temptation to remain in, or return to, that state). Sometimes there is no relief at all (e.g. when the resolution gives way immediately to a larger problem, or when the resolution is just that: through widening the angle or deepening the focus, one sees the problem for the first time as it really is)" [20]. If we take on board Wittgenstein's concept of *Übersicht* as " ... an overview, a perspicuous representation of a problematic area of human engagement and activity (a particular 'language-game' within our 'form of life'), where a partial view, or a 'one-sided diet', of the range of diverse phenomena in question leads us to generalize, to elevate one case to a paradigm of all. Or, with an impulse to generalize unleashed, we may posit mythical mental processes and entities in order merely to fill in the form of an explanatory scheme misappropriated from some other area (often through misleading grammatical analogies where differences are occluded by surface-language similarities); or to commit still others of a long litany of conceptual misdeeds ... [then] *Übersicht* produces the 'understanding which consists in "seeing connections"' [74] – and the attainment of such *Übersicht* allows the "mental mist which seems to enshroud our ordinary use of language to disappear." We can therefore conclude that " ... the therapy conception plays the vital but subordinate role. It is one essential way of achieving an *Übersicht*. But it is still the achievement of that *Übersicht* which is the defining end of philosophy ... that simultaneously 'gives philosophy peace' and makes us 'at home' in the world" [20]. But here we must surely hear that "still, small voice inside" reminding us that "We are left with only two possible ways to regard Wittgenstein. He was either the greatest Western philosopher since Plato, or he was a brilliant fraudster who bewitched us with his use of language" [3]. Regardless of what we decide on this issue his effect is wide-reaching, and the next article applies his philosophicomysticolinguistic ideas to modern therapeutic practice [29]. We shall investigate practical methods from Psycho-chaotic Semiotics [75] and Neuro-linguistic Programming [76] to utilize the fact that intrapersonally "we communicate almost entirely in the language of the aural and visual world" in order to "train ourselves to be more positive, because a positive approach to listening inside and seeking our own Wisdom attracts that which is higher and more positive within us."

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